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Abstract
The “taxation of the digital economy” is currently at the top of the global inter-
national tax policymaking agenda. A core claim some European governments are 
advancing is that user data or user participation in the digital economy justifies a 
gross tax on digital receipts, new profit attribution criteria, or a special formulary 
apportionment factor in a future formulary regime targeted specifically at the 
“digital economy.” Just a couple years ago the OECD undertook an evaluation of 
whether the digital economy can (or should) be “ring-fenced” as part of the BEPS 
project, and concluded that it neither can be nor should be.
Importantly, concluding that there should be no special rules for the digital economy 
does not resolve the broader question of whether the international tax system 
requires reform. The practical reality appears to be that all the largest economies 
have come to agree either that a) there is something wrong with the taxation of 
the “digital economy,” or b) there is something more fundamentally wrong with 
the structure of the current international tax system given globalization and 
technological trends.
This paper is intended as a limited exploration of the second (or third, or fourth) 
best. It analyzes three policy options that have been discussed in general terms in the 
current global debate. First, I consider whether “user participation” justifies chang-
ing profit allocation results in the digital economy alone. I conclude that applying 
the user participation concept in a manner that is limited to the digital economy 
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is intellectually indefensible; at most it amounts to mer-
cantilist ring-fencing. Moreover, at the technical level 
user participation faces all the same challenges as more 
comprehensive and principled proposals for reallocating 
excess returns among jurisdictions. Second, I consider one 
such comprehensive international tax reform idea, loosely 
referred to by the moniker “marketing intangibles.” This 
idea represents a compromise between the present transfer 
pricing system and sales or destination-based reforms 
to the transfer pricing regime. I conclude that splitting 
taxing rights over “excess” returns between the present 
transfer pricing system and a destination-based approach 
is complex, creates new sources of potential conflict, and 
requires relatively extensive tax harmonization. This 
conclusion applies equally to user participation and mar-
keting intangibles. If such a mechanism were nevertheless 
pursued, I suggest that a formulary system for splitting the 
excess return is the most manageable approach. Third, I 
consider “minimum effective taxation” ideas. I conclude 
that, as compared to the other two policy options discussed 
herein, minimum effective taxation provides a preferable 
path for multilateral cooperation.
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Introduction
For the University of Chicago Federal Tax Conference in 
November 2018, I was asked to write a paper “discussing 
what the U.S. position should be and how the U.S. tax 
rules should be changed (or not) in reaction to European 
tax changes such as the proposed gross tax on digital 
receipts, the digital PE, and the diverted profits tax.”
A core tax policy claim some European governments 
are advancing is that user data or user participation in the 
digital economy justifies a gross tax on digital receipts, 
new profit attribution criteria, or a special formulary 
apportionment (“FA”) factor in a future formulary 
regime. One fundamental question these claims raise 
is whether there is anything unique about the digital 
economy. In the BEPS project the OECD undertook an 
evaluation of whether the digital economy can (or should) 
be “ring-fenced,” and concluded that it neither can be nor 
should be. But the OECD’s conclusion is not stopping 
some European governments from pursuing proposals 
that attempt to apply special tax regimes to a limited set 
of digital businesses.1
Importantly, simply concluding that there should be no 
special rules for the digital economy does not resolve the 
broader question of whether the international tax system 
requires reform prompted in part by the digitalization 
of the economy. Indeed, a debate about this question is 
ongoing at the OECD. We know more about the contours 
of that debate today than we did when I was first asked 
to undertake this paper. The practical reality appears 
to be that all the largest economies have come to agree 
either that a) there is something wrong with the taxation 
of the “digital economy,” or b) there is something more 
fundamentally wrong with the structure of the current 
international tax system in an era of globalization and 
digitalization.2 Government representatives have now 
made this plain in multiple public forums. So, one way 
or the other, we lack a stable status quo.3
This paper sets out some considerations for U.S. inter-
national tax policymaking and international tax diplomacy 
in this uncertain environment. To that end, Part I briefly 
describes four disparate background considerations that 
should inform our thinking. Part IA describes the decline 
of the arm’s-length standard, which underpinned our 
historic understandings about how to attribute profits 
as among entities within a multinational corporation 
(“MNC”). I argue that internationally the arm’s-length 
standard as we knew it before the BEPS project is largely 
gone, and has been replaced by an unsustainable concept 
for profit attribution that I label the bourgeois labor theory 
of value (“BLTV”). Part IB describes the relationship 
between the arm’s-length standard, jurisdiction to tax, 
and the attribution of profits to permanent establishments 
(“PE”). It highlights that under OECD principles, attribu-
tion of profits to PEs is accomplished through application 
of the OECD’s transfer pricing guidelines (“TPG”). Part 
IC recounts various acts of tax unilateralism abroad, often 
focused on the tech sector, and including the trend toward 
abandoning historic limits on jurisdiction to tax. Part ID 
describes the United States’ 2017 tax reform in that global 
context, with a particular focus on the global intangible 
low-taxed income (“GILTI”) and the BEAT.
The remainder of the paper is intended as an explora-
tion of the second (or third, or fourth) best. For purposes 
of this paper, I therefore do not analyze options that 
were considered and rejected in the most recent U.S. tax 
reform, including a destination-based cash flow tax or an 
integrated corporate tax system, and certain options that 
never made it into the most recent tax reform debate, such 
as adopting a VAT.
The discussion is instead limited to three options that 
have been discussed in general terms in the current global 
debate. Each of these options preserves a classic corporate 
tax system that includes an entity-level tax on the normal 
return to capital. One further important caveat is that 
in this paper I attempt as best I can to fill in ideas that 
have been described with a very high level of generality 
with additional potential content, in order to motivate 
the analysis.
Part II focuses on the European Commission and Her 
Majesty’s Treasury (“HMT”) stated view that user par-
ticipation should be acknowledged as a source of value 
creation in the digital economy and concludes that the 
user participation concept has application well beyond 
the so-called digital economy. Applying the concept in 
a manner that is limited to the digital economy is intel-
lectually indefensible; at most it amounts to mercantilist 
ring-fencing.
The user participation theory does, however, have an 
important relationship to other more generally applicable 
proposals for international tax reform. In particular, it 
involves a shift toward destination-based income taxa-
tion, in much the same manner as some other proposals 
for fundamental international income allocation reform, 
albeit only for one sector.
At least two more comprehensive and principled pro-
posals to reform the international tax system’s attribution 
of profits are apparently now being considered at the 
OECD. These respectively are often loosely referred to 
by the monikers “marketing intangibles” and “minimum 
taxation.” As publicly described, these ideas seem to be at 
an early stage of development.
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Part III evaluates a version of the “marketing intangibles” 
idea which I label the destination-based residual market 
profit allocation (“DBRMPA”). Part IV evaluates a ver-
sion of a minimum tax system that combines inbound 
and outbound measures, and which I label “minimum 
effective taxation.”
Part III builds on the discussion about “where we go 
from here” in transfer pricing provided by Andrus and 
Oosterhuis in a paper for the 2016 University of Chicago 
conference. The DBRMPA is related to that conference 
discussion of two years ago. In particular, it represents a 
compromise between the present transfer pricing system 
and sales or destination-based reforms to the transfer 
pricing system described in the Andrus/Oosterhuis paper. 
Part III concludes that splitting taxing rights over “excess” 
returns4 between the present transfer pricing system and a 
destination-based approached is complex. It creates new 
sources of potential conflict as between sovereigns and as 
between sovereigns and multinationals. Moreover, some 
destination specification problems for which solutions 
do not exist or at least are not widely known would need 
to be addressed. Finally, the DBRMPA likely requires 
extensive tax harmonization and information exchange; 
more so than a minimum tax approach. Importantly all of 
the above conclusions regarding a DBRMPA apply with 
equal rigor as technical critiques of user participation. The 
difference is simply that a DBRMPA applies to the whole 
economy and therefore—unlike user participation—has 
some principled basis. If a DBRMPA were pursued, Part 
III suggests that a formulary mechanism for doing so is 
the least technically challenging approach.
Part IV builds on the discussion of the GILTI and the 
BEAT in Part I as well as other discussions of the pros and 
cons of those provisions in tax forums over the last year. 
Part IV postulates that there may be a more sensible path 
for multilateral cooperation around minimum effective 
taxation. This approach could be both responsive to the 
current global international tax debate and build on (and 
help repair) our 2017 international tax reform. I conclude 
that a minimum effective taxation approach would be 
preferable to a DBRMPA.
I. Background
A. The Decline of the Arm’s-Length Standard
Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention is intended 
to ensure that MNCs do not obtain inappropriate tax 
advantages by pricing transactions within the group dif-
ferently than independent enterprises would do at “arm’s 
length.” More than half of world trade is now intra-firm.5 
Thus, more than half of world trade is subject to transfer 
pricing.
Under the arm’s-length principle, multinational groups 
are supposed to divide their income for tax purposes among 
affiliates in the different countries in which the MNC does 
business, in a way that is meant to emulate the results that 
would transpire if the transactions had occurred between 
independent enterprises.6 For most of the last 40 years, the 
arm’s-length principle represented a consensual solution 
reached among technicians for the problem of allocating tax 
between different parts of an MNC.7 Although the mantra 
of “arm’s length” masked real disagreement, and members 
of the transfer pricing practitioner community often held 
the view that there was substantial controversy as to the 
proper implementation of the arm’s-length standard, the 
range of interpretation was, in practice, reasonably nar-
row. Major transfer pricing disputes arose with regularity, 
but they were addressed within a framework that largely 
respected intercompany contracts and the concept of allo-
cation of risk within a multinational group.8
In the last decade, however, the “arm’s-length standard” 
became extraordinarily controversial.9 Transfer pricing 
even became the subject of contentious discussion among 
high-level elected officials with no tax expertise at all.10 
Moreover, the so-called “stateless income”11 narrative 
became commonly accepted by tax policymakers in almost 
every developed economy.
As a result, preexisting norms developed by the com-
munity of transfer pricing specialists came under heavy 
and perhaps deserving scrutiny. Views around the level of 
deference to be given to intergroup contractual arrange-
ments in transfer pricing analyses diverged substantially, 
the consensus on the scope for recharacterizing intergroup 
transactions frayed, the consensus on respecting inter-
group equity contributions declined. Disputes among 
Importantly, simply concluding that 
there should be no special rules for 
the digital economy does not resolve 
the broader question of whether the 
international tax system requires 
reform prompted in part by the 
digitalization of the economy. Indeed, 
a debate about this question is 
ongoing at the OECD. 
MARCH 2019 89
government officials about whether value creation in cross-
border transactions undertaken by multinationals should 
be attributed to capital, labor, the market, user participa-
tion, or government support are now aired routinely.12
Enormous political pressures coming from the highest 
levels of government and the G-20 meant that some sort 
of outcome on transfer pricing was politically necessary 
as part of the BEPS project.13 Thus, in 2015, the BEPS 
project in effect endorsed the commonly held idea that 
the then-existing OECD TPG were broken. However, at 
the technical level bureaucrats failed to reach meaningful 
consensus on a clearly delineated alternative. The result 
was a reliance on high levels of constructive ambiguity 
buried in many pages of technocratic language in the 
transfer pricing outputs of the BEPS project.14
One phrase that captures this ambiguity is the com-
mitment to “align income taxation with value creation.” 
Everyone agrees on the principle—but no one agrees what 
it means.15
Nevertheless, if there was one central theme to the BEPS 
transfer pricing guidance taken as a whole, it was to put 
great weight for purposes of allocating intangible income 
and income associated with the contractual allocation of 
risk on “people functions.” The people functions of interest 
were activities by people who are of sufficiently high skill 
to engage in the development, enhancement, maintenance, 
protection, and exploitation of intangibles (the so-called 
“DEMPE functions”) as well as to be able to control finan-
cial risks, including those associated with the employment of 
intangibles. It is these people functions that the post-BEPS 
TPG treat as “meriting” the allocation of excess returns from 
intangibles. In contrast, contractual or legal ownership of 
an intangible is not particularly significant, nor is “routine” 
labor.16 I call this approach to transfer pricing the BLTV.
The labor theory of value asserts that the value of a good 
or service is fully dependent upon the labor used in its 
production. This theory was an important lynchpin in 
the philosophical ideas of Karl Marx. In contrast, con-
ventional capitalist economic theory relies on a theory of 
marginalism, in which the value of any good or service is 
thought to be determined by its marginal utility. Moreover, 
the pricing of a good or service is based on a relationship 
between that marginal utility, and the marginal produc-
tivity of all the factors of production required to produce 
the relevant good or service. In addition to labor, a key 
factor of production required to produce most goods and 
services is capital—including real and intangible assets 
purchased with capital.
The BLTV attributes profits quite heavily to the labor of 
certain highly educated workers who occupy upper middle 
management roles—roles and backgrounds broadly similar 
to those who negotiate transfer pricing rules for govern-
ments. The theoretical basis in economics for this BEPS 
transfer pricing settlement is unclear. It turns the Marxian 
labor theory of value on its head while being inconsistent 
with the conventional economic view, too. To my mind 
this feature makes it even less coherent than other possible 
bases for transfer pricing.
In the 2013 to 2015 period, the BLTV clearly seemed 
like an attractive alternative theory to various government 
officials. It addressed the “cash box” problem of multi-
national income being parked in zero tax places like the 
Cayman Islands and Bermuda, while attributing income to 
what the relevant officials viewed as “meaningful” activity.
However, the post-BEPS BLTV version of the OECD’s 
TPG, if implemented in good faith by tax administra-
tions around the world, would effectively provide that an 
MNC can in various situations save hundreds of millions 
or even billions of dollars by moving 20 or a 100 key jobs 
to a low-tax jurisdiction from a high-tax jurisdiction. And 
many of those jurisdictions—Switzerland, Ireland, and 
increasingly the UK—are attractive places to live, with 
talented, high-skill labor pools already in place.
Requiring that DEMPE activities be conducted in 
tax-favorable jurisdictions in order to justify income 
allocations to those jurisdictions encourages DEMPE 
jobs to move to those jurisdictions. This transfer pricing 
result—that income may be shifted by moving high-
skilled jobs—is deeply geopolitically unstable. From the 
corporate perspective, there can be huge incentives to shift 
DEMPE jobs if enough tax liability rides on the deci-
sion. At the same time, large developed economies with 
higher tax rates simply will not accept an arrangement 
that sees them losing both tax revenue and headquarters 
and R&D jobs.
In providing the above critique regarding the BEPS 
transfer pricing settlement, I do not wish to be misunder-
stood. Outside the transfer pricing area (BEPS Actions 
8–10), I believe the BEPS project had many notable 
accomplishments. Global best practices and minimum 
However, the digitization of the 
economy does force policymakers 
to confront a basic choice between 
destination-based corporate income 
taxation and residence-based 
corporate income taxation. 
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standards were developed with respect to important 
issues like hybridity, interest expense deductions, infor-
mation reporting, and more. The BEPS project certainly 
showed how soft law in the international tax space can 
be quite efficacious. But transfer pricing is sufficiently 
important that the failure to reach a sensible result in 
this space casts a shadow over the BEPS project generally. 
The failure to grapple in a sensible way with the ques-
tions raised by transfer pricing is one important reason 
the post-BEPS environment is characterized by much 
of the global tax chaos the BEPS project was supposed 
to prevent.17
B. The Relationship Between the Arm’s-
Length Standard, Jurisdiction to Tax, 
and the Attribution of Profits to PEs
Tax treaties specify when an enterprise based in one state 
has a sufficient connection to another state to justify 
taxation by the latter state. Under Article 5 of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention, a sufficient connection exists 
when an enterprise resident in one state (the “residence 
state”) has a “permanent establishment” in another state 
(the “source state”). The PE threshold must be met before 
the source state may tax that enterprise on active business 
income properly attributable to the enterprise’s activity 
in the source state. The PE rule encapsulated in Article 5 
thus represents the basic international standard governing 
jurisdiction to tax a non-resident enterprise.
Under Article 7 of the OECD’s Model Tax Convention, 
profits attributable to a PE are those that the PE would 
have derived if it were a separate and independent enter-
prise performing the activities which cause it to be a PE.18 
In 2010, the OECD issued a report on the attribution of 
profits to PEs. The report concluded that a PE should be 
treated as if it were distinct and separate from its overseas 
head office; and that assets and risks should be attributed 
to the PE or the head office in line with the location of 
“significant people functions.”
The post-2010 OECD approach to attributing prof-
its to a PE is commonly referred to as the Authorized 
OECD Approach (“AOA”).19 This approach is based on 
the adoption of the 2010 version of the business profits 
article (Article 7) of the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
Step one of the AOA leads to the recognition of internal 
dealings between the PE and its head office.20 Then, under 
step two, the guidance in the OECD’s TPG is applied 
by analogy to determine the arm’s-length pricing of the 
internal dealing between the PE and the head office.21 The 
2010 report on the AOA made clear that as the TPG were 
modified in the future, the AOA should be applied “by 
taking into account the guidance in the Guidelines as so 
modified from time to time.”22
In the BEPS project, many countries focused on the 
idea that technological progress (especially the Internet) 
and the globalization of business have made it easier to be 
heavily involved in the economic life of another jurisdic-
tion without meeting the historic PE threshold. In the end 
the BEPS project produced some notable changes to the 
PE threshold.23 These changes to Article 5 of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention are now being transposed into the 
global tax treaty network via the multilateral instrument, 
which itself represents another success of the BEPS proj-
ect. Importantly, however, the BEPS project concluded 
that the AOA did not need to be revisited in light of the 
changes to Article 5.
Fundamentally, the AOA was developed because if asso-
ciated enterprises in different countries were taxed under 
the arm’s-length standard under Article 9, but PEs were 
taxed under some other rule under Article 7, distortions 
between structures involving PEs and structures involving 
subsidiaries would arise. As a result, the OECD Model 
Tax Convention attempts to apply the TPG and the arm’s-
length principle as consistently as possible in both cases.24
Applying the AOA means that the PE and its head office 
are treated like independent enterprises. Note, however, 
that modern tax treaty PE tests are built to a significant 
degree on an underlying idea of dependence that differs 
from dependence/independence of ownership.25 Thus, 
the AOA taxes a PE as if the PE and its head office are 
independent enterprises, but by definition a dependent 
agent PE requires dependence. This paradox is a product 
of the decision to have the transfer pricing rules trump the 
PE rules and make the arm’s-length standard the central 
organizing principle.26 As a result, in our current legal 
construct, discussing the attribution of profits to a PE 
requires discussing which rules we wish to use to allocate 
MNE profits generally.
The alternative to the dependency criteria for establish-
ing the existence of a PE is physical presence. Arguably, 
A shift from our residence-based 
system to a destination-based 
corporate income tax, if agreed to 
by the major economies, is certainly 
a viable option.
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that mechanism for establishing a PE is just a proxy for 
meaningful presence in the economic life of a jurisdic-
tion through dependent agents. Historically the physical 
presence rule was also a pragmatic administrative consid-
eration. The physical presence of either an enterprise or a 
dependent agent of the enterprise was necessary in order 
to collect tax revenues from a taxpayer. Today, however, 
the pragmatic consideration is much less important in 
business-to-business transactions, given the development 
of reverse-charging type mechanisms and the ability 
to require a resident business to withhold from a non-
resident. Moreover, in the Internet era, it seems to me 
a losing argument to suggest that large digital firms do 
not have a meaningful global presence. So the principled 
debate with respect to jurisdiction to tax and attribution 
of profits to PEs is just the debate about how to allocate 
the profits of an MNE among jurisdictions generally.27
C. The Rise of International Tax 
Unilateralism and the Push to Tax Big Tech
Many jurisdictions decided quite quickly that they were 
not satisfied with the BEPS transfer pricing outcomes, at 
least with respect to specific companies or sectors where 
they wished to collect more revenue. The marquee actor 
in this story is the United Kingdom.
In 2015, before the BEPS project had ended, the United 
Kingdom imposed a 25% tax on profits deemed to be 
artificially diverted away from the UK. The Diverted Profit 
Tax (“DPT”) targets instances where, under existing PE 
rules, an MNC legitimately avoids a UK taxable pres-
ence, despite the fact that the MNC is supplying goods 
or services to UK customers. The UK took the position 
that the DPT was not covered by the United Kingdom’s 
income tax treaties, and therefore that the PE rules tax 
treaties specify as to when a state has jurisdiction to tax an 
enterprise based in another state did not apply to the DPT.
The primary justification for OECD countries recom-
mending and the G-20 launching the BEPS project had 
been to develop rules-based multilateral reforms that 
would prevent unilateral actions by the countries partici-
pating in the BEPS project. The UK adopted the DPT at 
the same time that it was helping lead the BEPS project. 
The UK’s decision both to lead a multilateral project that 
was supposed to set internationally agreed rules that would 
prevent inconsistent unilateral action, and at the same time 
unilaterally adopt the DPT, a tax that was not consistent 
with BEPS, was broadly perceived as a significant blow to 
tax multilateralism. The decision treated sovereignty as a 
license for organized hypocrisy. But for the DPT, one could 
imagine that a more cooperative international tax envi-
ronment might have evolved out of the BEPS project.28
Under the DPT, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(“HMRC”) can choose which companies it wishes to 
pursue and to what degree.29 Thus, the DPT also struck 
a blow against non-discrimination principles in interna-
tional taxation. Indeed, in press interviews UK govern-
ment officials referred to the DPT simply as the “Google 
Tax.”30 The extent to which the DPT is an arbitrary levy 
on targets of interest to HMRC is well-illustrated by the 
12-fold increase in revenues raised by the DPT between 
2015/2016 and 2017/2018.31 Twelve-fold increases in 
revenue without a change in the rate or rules simply do 
not happen when tax law functions in the normal way.32
Following the UK’s lead, by late 2017, countries as 
diverse as Australia, Argentina, Chile, France, India, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, and 
Uruguay had taken unilateral actions not limited by or 
consistent with the BEPS agreements. These measures are 
generally designed to increase levels of inbound corporate 
income taxation. Many are structured so that, as a practical 
matter, they primarily affect U.S. MNCs. Among other 
examples, in 2016 Australia enacted a DPT-like measure 
with a 40% tax rate (also publicly known as the “Google 
Tax”). India imposed a 6% “equalization levy” on out-
bound payments to non-resident companies for digital 
advertising services. India’s legislation authorized extend-
ing the tax to all digital services by administrative action. 
The Israel Tax Authority announced an interpretation of 
Israeli law that significantly reduces the level of physical 
presence necessary for direct taxation of non-resident 
digital companies. The Korean government is consider-
ing amendments to the Korean Corporate Tax Act to 
What analyzing the DBRMPA 
highlights is that compromise 
between a destination-based income 
tax and a residence-based corporate 
income tax, even principled 
compromise, is hard to administer. 
Splitting the baby is probably 
unwise. If policymakers wish for a 
destination-based income tax, they 
should really try to go all the way 
there.
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override Korean tax treaties and treat “global information 
and communications technology companies” as having a 
digital Korean PE. Uruguay has enacted, and Argentina is 
considering, measures similar to those adopted in India. 
During this same time period the Directorate-General for 
Competition (“DG Comp”) at the European Commission 
reconceptualized its “state aid” concept in the international 
tax context, notably by claiming that DG Comp was not 
limited by the OECD’s arm’s-length standard in determin-
ing whether tax rulings were consistent with EU law.33
More recently, governments around the world have been 
proposing or enacting taxes targeted specifically at digital 
advertising and online platforms. India went first with its 
previously-mentioned tax on digital advertising. Then, in 
September 2017, the European Commission called for 
new international rules that would alter the application 
of PE and transfer pricing rules for the digital economy 
alone.34 Moreover, the Commission argued that until such 
time as a digital-specific reform of the international tax 
system was agreed upon, an interim tax based on turn-
over, or a withholding mechanism, should be imposed on 
digital platform companies.35 The UK followed up on the 
Commission’s digital tax proposals with its own position 
paper on corporation tax and the digital economy.36 On 
October 29, 2018, the UK announced the introduction 
of a “digital services tax” that is based on turnover and is 
explicitly ring-fenced to hit only large search engine, social 
media, and online marketplace businesses.37 Other unilat-
eral measures focusing on the digital economy have been 
taken by India (significant economic presence PE),38 Israel 
(digital PE), and others. Like the earlier round of unilateral 
measures, some of these proposals have been described 
both in government documents and in the media as 
taxes targeting “GAFA:” Google, Apple, Facebook, and 
Amazon. However, the proposals generally are structured 
to have an impact beyond those four corporations.
Separately, in 2017 Germany adopted its “Act against 
Harmful Tax Practices with regard to Licensing of Rights.” 
New section 4j of the German Income Tax Act restricts 
deductions for royalties and similar payments made to 
related parties if such payments are subject to a non-
OECD compliant preferential tax regime and are taxed at 
an effective rate below 25%.39 The provision also includes 
a conduit rule along the same general lines as U.S. code 
provision section 7701(l).40
In 2017 the UK also opened consultations on a royalty 
withholding tax proposal, which is now scheduled to be 
enacted and in force from April 6, 2019.41 This withhold-
ing tax would generally apply where a non-UK entity 
making sales in the UK does not have a taxable presence 
in the UK. Withholding is also extended to payments for 
the right to distribute goods or perform specified services 
in the UK. Since there is no UK entity making a payment, 
the proposal applies almost exclusively to cases where a 
non-UK company selling to UK customers pays a royalty 
to a 3rd country jurisdiction. HMT describes the proposal 
as a step to tax the digital economy, but acknowledges 
that it has application beyond the digital sector. For 
example, imagine a Brazilian MNC has a subsidiary in 
Ireland making sales in the UK and paying a royalty to 
an entity in the Cayman Islands. Under these proposals, 
the UK would be trying to withhold from the royalty 
paid from Ireland to the Cayman Islands. The proposal 
thus raises the enforcement issues raised in the canonical 
SDI Netherlands case.
Realistically, more unilateral measures to increase source 
country taxation, market country taxation, or both are 
coming. These changes are likely to be somewhat unco-
ordinated, and sometimes unprincipled. Moreover, these 
moves toward source or market country taxation are 
likely to affect “old-line” businesses as well as the digital 
sector. Tax directors of multinationals in a wide range of 
industries already highlight that the label “BEPS” is used 
to justify a wide range of source-country tax adjustments 
that produce significant tax controversies.
Historically the multilateral international tax archi-
tecture was focused on residence country taxation. The 
international tax architecture around the world appears 
to be shifting toward more source-based or destination-
based taxation, but that transition is turning out to be 
very messy. The strategic questions for the United States 
created by this unsettled state of international tax affairs 
featured prominently in the final round of discussions 
about U.S. international tax reform.42
D. U.S. Tax Reform, the BEAT and the GILTI
By the time of the 2016 elections, there was wide-
spread consensus that the United States needed to 
reform its aberrant international corporate tax system. 
Commentators called for a lower corporate tax rate, 
and a move away from a deferral system and toward 
the dividend exemption systems that had become an 
international norm. Other countries had been taking 
these steps for years, while also increasing their reliance 
on consumption taxes and decreasing their reliance on 
corporate income taxes.
Nevertheless, at the outset of 2017, few commentators 
thought the U.S. political system would successfully bring 
a tax reform package to fruition. Then, as we all know, the 
United States surprised the world by enacting tax reform. 
The international corporate component of the reform was 
labeled as a shift to a “territorial” regime. However, the 
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law enacted actually moved the United States closer to 
a current worldwide tax system for outbound taxation, 
instantiated in a regime now known as the “GILTI.” At 
the same time, the United States followed the global trend 
in enacting unilateral measures intended to strengthen 
inbound taxation. The United States did so by adopting 
the “base erosion anti-abuse tax” in new section 59A of 
the Code (“BEAT”).
The GILTI is the main subject of Dana Trier’s conference 
paper and the panel immediately preceding the presen-
tation of this paper at the conference. Therefore, I will 
not go to any great lengths to describe the GILTI here. 
Practitioners have also written about the various twists and 
turns of the BEAT, and I do not propose to reconstruct 
the full breadth of that discussion, either. Nevertheless, 
for the sake of completeness a brief background on these 
provisions is appropriate.
1. GILTI. Code Sec. 951A requires each U.S. shareholder 
of a controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”) to include 
currently in its gross income its share of GILTI for the year. 
In very general terms, GILTl refers to a U.S. shareholder’s 
share of a CFC’s income above a 10% return on quali-
fied business asset investment (“QBAI”) with respect to 
everything other than five enumerated categories of CFC 
income. Those categories are effectively connected income, 
subpart F income, income that would be subpart F income 
but for the Code Sec. 954(b)(4) high-tax kickout, certain 
intercompany dividends, and foreign oil and gas extrac-
tion income. A U.S. shareholder of a CFC includes in 
income its GILTI in a manner similar to the inclusion 
mechanism for subpart F income. GILTI is eligible for 
a 50% deduction under Code Sec. 250 (through 2025). 
Therefore, a minimum effective U.S. tax rate of 10.5% 
applies to all GILTI earnings of CFCs of U.S. sharehold-
ers. Special rules apply regarding foreign taxes associated 
with GILTI. Very generally, if a U.S. shareholder that is 
a domestic corporation elects to take foreign tax credits 
for a taxable year, all of the foreign taxes associated with 
GILTI are included in its income as a deemed dividend 
under Code Sec. 78. However, only 80% of these foreign 
taxes are allowed as deemed paid foreign tax credits in the 
new GILTI foreign tax credit basket.43
The New York State Bar Association (“NYSBA”) 
observes that the GILTI can be understood conceptu-
ally as a hybrid between “a flat minimum domestic and 
foreign tax rate on a U.S. shareholder’s GILTI inclusions 
not associated with QBAI (the ‘flat rate theory’) and the 
imperfect adding of the GILTI regime onto the subpart 
F regime (the ‘add-on theory’).”44 One’s understanding 
of which theory should dominate can influence many 
regulatory decisions. But no matter how one thinks about 
the regime enacted in the statute (or how the regulations 
are written), the regime will generally produce at least a 
minimum 10.5% combined domestic and foreign tax on 
a U.S. shareholder’s GILTI not attributable to QBAI.45 
Moreover, given that the concerns in international tax 
policy are overwhelmingly intangible income-driven, and 
that the digital sector is “tangible asset light,” ignoring 
QBAI constitutes a reasonable first-order simplification 
for purposes of this paper.
Finally, it should be noted that most of the complexity 
entailed by the international tax regulations now being 
issued by the U.S. Treasury in this area are the product of 
the QBAI concept, the foreign tax credit basketing system 
enacted for GILTI, and the legislative design decision to 
layer a shareholder-level calculation on top of entity-level 
concepts. None of these features is inherent in or essential 
to enacting a flat rate minimum tax policy.46
2. The Relationship Between GILTI and the Digital Tax 
Debate. The consequences of GILTI for the international 
tax debate in the “digital” space should have been pro-
found. When the BEPS project began, the digital economy 
was a special area of focus because it was considered an 
important case of so-called “stateless income.”47
Following the 2017 legislation, the minimum tax rates 
on foreign earnings achievable for U.S.-headquartered 
firms have changed. Speaking generally, an intangible 
driven U.S.-parented multinational simply will not be 
able to achieve an effective tax rate on their foreign earn-
ings that is below 10.5%. An effective rate of 10.5% for 
corporate shareholders (after taking into account the 50% 
deduction described above) is comparatively unfavorable 
to the CFC regimes of most of the major trading partners 
of the United States, which typically tax CFC earnings in 
relatively limited circumstances. As a practical matter the 
consequence is that BEPS leading to stateless income—
the original driver for the entire international tax reform 
debate—is now a phenomenon that exists only for non-
U.S. headquartered multinationals.
Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, the four compa-
nies specifically targeted in documents issued at various 
points by the Commission, the French government, and 
the German coalition agreement, each face a 10.5% 
minimum tax on their foreign earnings. Since every EU 
member state has a dividend exemption system that does 
not include a minimum tax, and instead provides a 0% 
tax rate on foreign earnings when repatriated, companies 
like Volkswagen, Allianz, Daimler, Siemens in Germany, 
or BNP Paribas and Carrefour in France do not face a 
minimum tax burden on their foreign earnings. They 
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can, and in some circumstances still do, generate stateless 
income and achieve 0% tax on their foreign earnings. That 
is the reality of current U.S. corporate tax law as compared 
with the current corporate tax law of the largest continu-
ing members of the EU. Meanwhile, the UK’s corporate 
tax reforms beginning in 2012 were explicitly designed to 
ensure the ability of UK-headquartered multinationals to 
achieve a zero rate of tax on foreign earnings by generally 
exempting those earnings from UK tax.
Therefore, when the Commission or HMT now pro-
pose a solution for the digital sector, that proposal is not 
about addressing low-taxed income or leveling an unlevel 
playing field—the justifications given for rule changes in 
BEPS just a few years ago. Rather, the proposals are now 
clearly about a revenue shift to move tax revenue from 
jurisdictions of residence to the jurisdictions where digital 
companies have users.48
3. BEAT. The BEAT was enacted to address legislative 
concerns that the former U.S. international tax regime 
made foreign ownership of almost any asset or business 
more attractive than U.S. ownership from a tax perspec-
tive, thereby creating tax-driven incentives for foreign 
takeovers of U.S. firms and foreign acquisition of busi-
ness units previously owned by U.S. MNCs and financial 
pressures that encourage U.S. MNCs to “invert” (move 
their headquarters abroad), produce abroad for the U.S. 
market, and shift business income to low-tax jurisdictions 
abroad. Until recently, little policy attention was given 
to reining in the benefits that U.S. law gives to inbound 
multinationals that make foreign status more attractive 
than domestic status. In this regard the United States 
was a global outlier: in the rest of the world, governments 
have been focusing their policy efforts almost exclusively 
on inbound taxpayers that minimize their income in 
local jurisdictions since the onset of the financial crisis. 
With the BEAT, the United States took a bold but highly 
imperfect step to join the global consensus that inbound 
must be addressed.
New section 59A of the Code imposes an additional 
tax equal to the “base erosion minimum tax amount” (the 
“BEAT tax”) of “applicable taxpayers.”49 The BEAT tax 
generally means “the excess (if any) of an amount equal 
to 10 percent … of the modified taxable income of such 
taxpayer for the taxable year, over an amount equal to 
the regular tax liability … of the taxpayer for the taxable 
year, reduced (but not below zero) by [certain credits].”50 
In other words, the BEAT tax is calculated as the differ-
ence between the corporation’s regular tax liability and an 
alternative calculation based on the corporation’s modified 
taxable income.
Modified taxable income for BEAT tax purposes is gen-
erally defined as taxable income computed without regard 
to any deduction with respect to a payment to a foreign 
related party.51 Certain exceptions (notably for certain 
payments for services) apply. Payments for cost of goods 
sold (“COGS”) also have no effect on the calculation of 
modified taxable income because, as a technical matter, 
COGS are a reduction in gross receipts (rather than a 
deductible payment).52 The characterization of payments, 
especially with respect to transactions involving bundled 
services and goods, can therefore affect whether a payment 
is within the scope of the BEAT provision. The BEAT’s 
“modified taxable income” base is also determined without 
regard to the base erosion percentage of any net operating 
loss (“NOL”) allowed for the tax year.
Only “applicable taxpayers” are subject to the BEAT 
at all. To be an applicable taxpayer, a U.S. corporation 
and its affiliates53 must meet certain criteria.54 Notably, 
the U.S. corporation generally must have a “base erosion 
percentage” of 3% or higher. This base erosion percentage 
is generally determined by dividing the aggregate amount 
of a taxpayer’s “base erosion tax benefits” for the taxable 
year, by the sum of the aggregate amount of the deduc-
tions allowable to the taxpayer, plus certain base erosion 
tax benefits allowable to the taxpayer.
The BEAT has been the subject of cogent critiques by 
the NYSBA and other commentators.55 The key BEAT 
complications for purposes of this discussion relate to 
the treatment of foreign tax credits and the base erosion 
percentage concept. In my view, these two features of the 
BEAT should be removed.
Most tax credits are disregarded in determining regular 
tax liability for purposes of the BEAT calculation.56 Most 
importantly, foreign tax credits are disregarded. The treat-
ment of foreign tax credits under the BEAT disfavors 
foreign taxes paid by BEAT taxpayers relative to any other 
business expense. In other words, foreign taxes are in 
effect not even deductible for BEAT taxpayers. In various 
circumstances, the rule disregarding the value of foreign 
tax credits for purposes of measuring hypothetical regular 
tax liability increases the BEAT minimum tax dollar for 
dollar.57 Foreign taxes paid by U.S. MNCs are thus treated 
almost as if they were equivalent to bribes and payments 
made to entities in Iran and North Korea. This treatment 
is not justifiable. Moreover, disallowing foreign tax credits 
has no clear relationship to base erosion.
Second, if a taxpayer’s “base erosion percentage” is 3% 
or less, they are not subject to the BEAT. The base ero-
sion percentage is generally determined by dividing the 
aggregate amount of “base erosion tax benefits” of the 
taxpayer for the taxable year, by the sum of the aggregate 
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amount of the deductions allowable to the taxpayer plus 
certain other tax benefits allowable to the taxpayer. Since 
both the numerator and denominator of the base erosion 
percentage fraction represent gross rather than net con-
cepts, the rule is highly manipulable, and the cliff feature 
encourages manipulation.
Importantly, the BEAT includes a broad grant of regu-
latory authority to the Treasury. The provision includes 
specific authority to prescribe such regulations as may 
be necessary or appropriate. The BEAT also includes a 
number of specific grants of regulatory authority. These 
include providing “for such adjustments to the application 
of this section as are necessary to prevent the avoidance of 
the purposes of this section, including through” the use 
of unrelated persons, conduit transactions, other inter-
mediaries, or transactions designed in whole or in part to 
characterize payments otherwise subject to the BEAT as 
not subject to the BEAT, or (quite extraordinarily) even 
regulations preventing taxpayers from obtaining benefits 
from substituting payments not subject to the BEAT 
as drafted with payments that would normally not be 
subject to the BEAT.58 The intent behind the scope of 
this remarkable grant of specific regulatory authority is 
not discussed in the legislative history. Nevertheless, the 
language is sufficiently expansive as to raise the question 
of whether Congress intended the BEAT to give Treasury 
authority to reconsider allocation of profits generally for 
minimum tax purposes.
II. Value Creation and User 
Participation59
Academic commentators of all ideological stripes have now 
explained in multiple articles that the international tax 
system is not now, and never has been, based on a value 
creation principle.60 Moreover, as I suggested in Part IA, 
no one entirely knows or agrees on the precise meaning of 
“value creation.” Finally, the consensus academic view is 
that any exercise to define specific sources of value creation 
is entirely subjective.61
Nevertheless, post-BEPS, various governments often 
repeat the mantra that “the international tax framework 
is based on a principle that the profits of a business should 
be taxed in the countries in which it creates value.”62 One 
proposal that features prominently among “value creation-
ists” is known by the label “user participation.” It purports 
to give appropriate credit to user participation in value 
creation in the digital economy. This idea originated from 
HMT, was then taken up by the European Commission, 
and is now being studied by the OECD.
HMT and the European Commission both maintain 
there is something distinctive about value creation in the 
digital economy. They focus on the example of a user 
uploading data on a social media platform to illustrate 
the importance of user participation in the digital space. 
The Commission argues that in this case user participa-
tion contributes to value creation because users’ “data 
will later be used and monetised for targeted advertising. 
The profits are not necessarily taxed in the country of the 
user (and viewer of the advert), but rather in the country 
where the advertising algorithms has been developed, 
for example. This means that the user contribution to 
the profits is not taken into account when the company 
is taxed.”63
HMT and the Commission also assert there is some-
thing special about online marketplaces and other “col-
laborative platforms,” that “generates revenue through 
matching suppliers and purchasers of a good,” or “charges 
a commission for bringing together supply and demand for 
assets and possessions owned by individuals. The success 
of those businesses is reliant on the active involvement of 
users on either side of the intermediated market and the 
expansion of that user base to allow the business to ben-
efit from network effects, economies of scale and market 
power.”64 In contrast, HMT claims participation of users 
in non-digital businesses is generally “passive.”
Two immediate questions arise with respect to the 
user participation theory put forth by HMT and the 
Commission. The first question is whether there is any 
reason to believe that users only meaningfully contribute 
to value creation in the context of certain digital platforms. 
The second is how, across the whole of the economy, one 
would determine when users contribute to value creation, 
and to what degree.
If user participation is a meaningful concept, it cannot 
be rationally limited to information communication tech-
nologies. Consider a clinical trial from a user participation 
perspective: such trials involve a corporation giving thou-
sands of individuals free medicine over a period of years in 
exchange for those users providing deeply personal medical 
data, as well as a service to the company—the use of their 
bodies for purposes of experimentation. The resulting 
data is monetized by obtaining a patent and customizing 
products to specific diseases and patient populations. This 
user data is also required for regulatory approvals, without 
which the company may not sell anything at all.
The data provided by patients is deeply private biometric 
and health information. In this sense, the data users pro-
vide in exchange for free products in the medical economy 
is often substantially more extensive and personal than the 
data that a digital user provides. Moreover, their engage-
ment with the providers of their treatment is often more 
sustained than a digital user of a social media platform. 
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After all, in some cases disengaging from the company 
(ceasing to supply data in exchange for treatment) might 
fundamentally impact a drug user’s health. In sum, both 
active user participation and data contribution appear to 
be part of the medical economy.
The most meaningful objection to the above analogy 
between user participation in the digital economy and user 
participation in the medical economy relates to the fact 
that the medical economy generally does not benefit from 
either “multisided business models” or network effects. 
Indeed Commission, HMT, and OECD documents each 
often highlight these two economic phenomena in describ-
ing potential justifications for a special profit allocation 
for user participation in the digital economy.65
Neither multisided business models nor network effects 
are new economic phenomena, nor are those phenomena 
limited to the digital platform businesses affected by user 
participation proposals. Multisided platform businesses 
are generally defined as businesses that a) offer distinct 
products or services, b) to different groups of custom-
ers, c) whom a “platform” connects, d) in simultaneous 
transactions. In simpler terms, they are market  makers—
businesses that help unrelated parties get together to 
exchange value. Network effects refer to the phenomenon 
whereby a product or service gains additional value as 
more people use it.
Before the advent of the Internet, the classic example of 
a multisided business model with network effects used in 
economics discussions involved financial intermediation. 
Credit card businesses represent one example. On one 
side of the business consumers are offered convenience 
and financing, and on the other side merchants obtain 
a mechanism to receive payment other than in cash. 
Moreover, the more merchants accept a credit card, the 
more attractive a credit card is to consumers, and the more 
consumers hold a credit card, the more willing merchants 
are to accept the card and its related interconnection fee.66 
Other “non-digital” multisided business models with 
network effects include newspapers, traditional broadcast 
television, video game consoles, financial exchanges, and 
even farmer’s markets (which charge rent to sellers, and 
allow shoppers to enter the market for free).
Of course a farmer’s market has network effects because 
it is more valuable to buyers and sellers respectively to 
the extent that there are more farmers and more local 
shoppers participating. However, the magnitude of the 
network effect is much greater, and potentially more salient 
for tax purposes, when the “platform” (the marketplace) 
involved can intermediate transactions globally. That 
issue of magnitude is presumably what HMT and the 
European Commission think is special—network effects 
and multisided business models combined with so-called 
“cross-jurisdictional scale without mass.”
Focusing on the issue of large network effects combined 
with cross-jurisdictional scale without mass brings us to 
financial exchanges. Network effects are the key feature of 
successful financial market making, because for transac-
tions to take place there must be both buyers and sellers. 
Specifically, market liquidity is an important feature 
in determining transaction costs and making a market 
attractive to participants, and the number of participants 
is what determines liquidity. As the number of buyers and 
sellers on a given exchange increase, liquidity increases, and 
costs fall. Without enough buyers and sellers, the market 
literally falls apart.
As an example, consider the Lloyd’s insurance mar-
ketplace, based in the UK. The vast majority of Lloyd’s 
business involves insuring non-UK risks, often without 
any physical presence in the jurisdictions where the 
covered risk exists on behalf of either Lloyd’s or the 
underwriters and syndicates that form the Lloyd’s mar-
ketplace.67 Moreover, the vast majority of the capital 
in the Lloyd’s market does not come from the UK.68 
But, as Lloyd’s itself explains, the certainty provided 
by the marketplace as well as the network effects from 
Lloyd’s global network of insurance companies, brokers, 
and coverholders “makes Lloyd’s the world’s leading 
(re)insurance platform.”69 The London stock exchange 
is another important financial marketplace, albeit one 
where at least some of the offerings are not as bespoke 
(and therefore require less data) than is customary at 
Lloyd’s.
Do users somehow participate less “actively” in tradi-
tional financial marketplaces when they enter into transac-
tions than they do in online sharing marketplaces? The key 
participation feature of online marketplaces are reviews 
and ratings of sellers and buyers.
Much more complex user data is shared among the 
specialist syndicates, brokers, and coverholders partici-
pating in the Lloyd’s insurance market than is shared by 
short-term renters on a vacation rentals platform.70 And 
these market participants interact in more complicated 
ways than do renters and owners. Moreover, Lloyd’s has 
now created a mandate that syndicates enter into many 
of their contracts electronically over a digital platform.71 
So, using Lloyd’s as an example, it becomes difficult to 
see the clear distinction between an insurance interme-
diation platform and, for instance, the accommodation 
intermediation platform represented by Airbnb. It is true 
that historically one business (reinsurance) was globalized 
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before the advent of the Internet while the other (home 
rentals) was not. And historically underwriters sometimes 
exchanged views offline, while renters often found it hard 
to exchange views at all. However, now both businesses 
are globalized, users on both the buy side and the sell side 
share their views with one another in both industries, and 
one industry is fully digitalized while the other is working 
to move in that direction. It seems intellectually unsustain-
able to claim there is a relevant difference with respect to 
user participation between the accommodation traded 
on Airbnb and bespoke products traded electronically in 
financial markets.
The Internet of Things (“IoT”) is likely to make the 
distinction between businesses with network effects and 
multisided business models and more “traditional” busi-
ness even harder to maintain. IoT refers to the network 
of physical objects embedded with sensors and network 
connectivity that allows the collection and exchange of 
data. Such sensors are becoming ubiquitous in the devices 
we encounter in our daily environment. A large number of 
IoT applications are being developed in various domains 
by start-ups, SMEs, and large MNCs alike.72
One widely discussed IoT example is the idea of the 
“connected car.” Connected cars are likely to feature seats 
that face a windshield that is akin to a computer screen.73 
Trends in automotive research and development involve 
navigation and entertainment display screens built into 
the dashboard to offer Internet-based information and 
media, as well as sensors intended to pick up information 
from roads and other networked cars. On one model of 
what constitutes “active user participation,” a connected 
car would have all the components for user participation 
in place. The user would provide geo proximity data by 
driving, financial information by leasing, and be in a car 
that acts as a channel to deliver advertising to a “captive” 
recipient.
On another model, use of a connected car would not 
constitute “active user participation” because the user of 
a connected car would not be actively writing a message 
or rating a product or service. In that case, however, clicks 
on a social media platform would also seem to constitute 
“passive” user participation. It seems inconceivable that 
“going” to a website or “searching” virtually should be 
classified as active user participation but going somewhere 
physically should be classified as passive activity.
Some projections suggest that there will be more than 
30 billion IoT devices in use by 2020.74 In addition to 
connected cars, commercial and industrial applications, 
driven largely by building automation, industrial automa-
tion, and lighting, are projected to account for many of 
the new connected devices coming into use between 2018 
and 2030.75 If those projections come to pass, it is hard to 
imagine that user participation in historically non-digital 
sectors will not exceed any de minimis user participation 
threshold.
In sum, it does not seem intellectually defensible to 
suggest that users only meaningfully contribute to value 
creation in the context of certain digital platforms, or to 
think that the boundaries of the idea are clear enough to 
allow for anything approaching reasonable implementa-
tion. Indeed, as articulated thus far it is difficult to view 
the proposal as anything other than either a) ill-conceived 
or b) transparently instrumentalist and mercantilist.
But understanding the user participation perspective 
remains important. For one thing, the user participa-
tion proposal highlights the political angle much of 
Europe brings to the current digital tax debate. Even 
more importantly, HMT and the Commission have both 
suggested that when “active user participation” is pres-
ent, “jurisdictions in which users are located should be 
entitled to tax a portion of those businesses’ profits.”76 
HMT wishes to achieve this result using what is in 
effect a formulary system.77 The Commission proposes 
doing so based on a facts and circumstances arm’s-length 
analysis of the value of user participation.78 Either way, 
these proposals seek to allocate some (although not 
all) of the excess return of a business to the destination 
jurisdiction. And that issue—destination-based income 
taxation—lies at the heart of the intellectual debate 
about the future of the corporate income tax as applied 
cross-border.
Indeed, the core of Part III is a discussion of a pro-
posal for allocating excess returns through a reform of 
the international tax system that would create a hybrid 
between a destination-based income tax and the present 
residence-based system. Such a system would, like the 
user participation proposals, allocate a part of the excess 
return of a business to market (“user”) jurisdictions. Thus, 
the second key question regarding a user participation 
proposal, namely, how, across the whole of the economy, 
one would determine to what degree users contribute to 
“value creation,” is conceptually parallel to the question of 
how, across the whole of the economy, one would allocate 
a part of the excess return to market jurisdictions. That 
is the “bridge” between the user participation proposal 
and the “marketing intangibles” or “DBRMPA” proposal 
described in Part III. Importantly, this means that all of the 
technical and administrative issues that will be described 
in Part IIIB below also apply in equal measure to any user 
participation proposal.
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The principled issue is whether, how, and to what degree, 
across the whole of the economy, law should allocate 
the excess return of a business to consumer/user/market 
jurisdictions for corporate income tax purposes. The key 
difference between the proposal described in Part III and 
the user participation theory is that the proposal in Part 
III does not attempt to ring-fence the digital economy. 
Rather, it tackles this allocation question generally, without 
resorting to unsustainable and unjustifiable distinctions 
in business models.
III. Where We Go from Here: Destination-
Based Income Tax Reform?
This Part considers the “marketing intangibles” or 
DBRMPA idea that constitutes a compromise between 
the current transfer pricing system and a destination-basis 
income tax. This hybrid approach may be under consider-
ation in some form or other at the OECD. My formula-
tion of this approach may or may not be the same as what 
is under discussion at the OECD, as the proposal has not 
been publicly described in any detail. However, no matter 
how a marketing intangibles concept is formulated, certain 
key issues will have to be addressed. These include how 
to split excess returns between the current arm’s-length 
system and an allocation to market countries, and how to 
determine destination so as to split the amount allocated 
to market countries among such countries.
The DBRMPA described here is a compromise between 
the present transfer pricing system and a form of destina-
tion-based income tax known as a destination-based residual 
profit allocation (“DBRPA”). The DBRMPA proposal 
divides intangible returns between those generated by 
so-called “customer-based” or marketing intangibles and 
those generated by other (presumably usually “production-
based”) intangibles. Residual returns deemed attributable to 
customer-based or marketing intangibles would be allocated 
to the market—the jurisdictions where the customers reside. 
Residual returns deemed attributable to other intangibles 
would be allocated based on current transfer pricing rules 
(i.e., the BLTV). Importantly, in this sense the DBRMPA 
functions in the same way as user participation, but does 
so across the whole economy, instead of ring-fencing this 
change based on a cliff effect determined by whether a busi-
ness is categorized as being “digitalized” or not.
A. Background: The Destination-Based 
Residual Profit Allocation
The DBRPA proposal was developed by a group con-
sisting of Alan Auerbach, Michael Devereaux, Michael 
Keen, Paul Oosterhuis, Wolfgang Schön, and John Vella. 
The idea is explained in the excellent paper authored by 
Joe Andrus and Paul Oosterhuis for this conference in 
2016 entitled “Transfer Pricing After BEPS: Where Are We 
and Where Should We Be Going.” Further details appear 
in a presentation given by Paul Oosterhuis at Oxford 
University in 2016.79 The proposal represents an attempt 
to move toward a destination-basis corporate income tax 
system by means that can at least be described as remain-
ing consistent with some of the principles of the current 
“arm’s-length” transfer pricing architecture.
The DBRMPA is fundamentally a compromise between 
a DBRPA and the current transfer pricing system. Thus, 
analyzing the DBRMPA first and foremost requires under-
standing the DBRPA.80
The DBRPA proposal is animated by the understand-
ing that the location of consumers is less mobile than the 
location of booked profits, intellectual property, corpo-
rate assets, corporate employees, or any other element 
of value creation. In this sense it is similar to sales-based 
FA. However, the DBRPA attempts to separate “excess” 
or “residual” returns from “routine returns,” and provide 
a normal rate of return to productive functions. The first-
order advantages of a DBRPA are supposed to be reduced 
incentives to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions, reduced 
complexity and reduced administrative burdens.
The core idea is to salvage the existing arm’s-length 
system with respect to routine returns, while using a 
sales-based system to allocate residual returns. How would 
it work? To allocate excess/residual returns, the DBRPA 
deems the country in which customer sales take place 
to be an “entrepreneurial” affiliate with respect to local 
market sales, and ascribes all “non-routine” profits to that 
affiliate.81 Achieving this result would require MNCs to 
measure gross revenues by country and by product using 
some concept of “destination” or “place of supply.” Global 
costs would need to be measured at a product line level, 
and then either traced or apportioned out to revenues 
from specific countries.
The DBRPA mechanism for allocating the residual share 
to the market is quite similar to a cost-sharing approach 
for allocating income attributed to intangibles. However, 
instead of allocating the residual profit to an “entrepreneur-
ial risk-taker” in an MNC group defined as the affiliate that 
owns the intangible property and takes on financial risk (as 
in contemporary cost-sharing models), the residual profit 
is instead allocated to affiliates in the respective market 
jurisdictions. The proposal in effect imposes deemed con-
tractual arrangements to which traditional transfer pricing 
methods are then applied. As a result, the DBRPA allocates 
excess returns on a product line by product line basis rather 
than an entity by entity basis. In doing so it appropriately 
escapes the “formulary apportionment” label.
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1. Comparison of DBRPA with Sales-Based FA. The 
most important difference between a DBRPA and sales-
based FA is that a DBRPA would modify transfer pricing 
methodologies so as to allocate only “excess” or “residual” 
profits to the jurisdiction of sale.82 Sales-based FA systems 
do not necessarily allocate any income to jurisdictions 
where corporate functions take place. In the United States, 
our status as a very large market obscures this concern that 
sales-based FA raises. But consider a small jurisdiction; 
let’s call it Denmark. Whatever the theoretical merits, 
it is probably hard for politicians to explain to Danish 
taxpayers that a Danish corporation which exploits a 
range of local benefits to make outputs that are wholly or 
almost wholly exported will pay no or almost no corporate 
income tax in Denmark. The cost-plus markup on produc-
tive functions in the DBRPA is somewhat responsive to 
the concern that sales-based FA provides no revenue to 
jurisdictions where economic activity takes place. It solves 
the “Denmark problem” to some degree.
Although DBRPA is not a sales-based FA proposal, in 
many circumstances DBRPA could produce results that 
are similar to the residual sales-based formulary apportion-
ment (“RFA”) proposal put forth by Avi-Yonah, Clausing 
and Durst in 2011. RFA would allocate a fixed markup 
(7.5% in the Durst et al proposal) on costs to entities that 
undertake activity within an MNC.83 All other profits 
would then be allocated to the destination/market country.
The key difference between DBRPA and RFA is that 
DBRPA imposes a destination-basis allocation for residual 
returns on a product line by product line and individual-
ized country by country basis.84 If percentage of gross 
sales revenue on the one hand and percentage of corporate 
profit on the other vary significantly by country, DBRPA 
and RFA would generate different results.85 Similarly, if 
average profit levels vary by product line and some coun-
tries generate more revenue for an MNE from high-profit 
products while other countries generate more revenue for 
an MNE from low-profit products, DBRPA and RFA 
would generate different results.86
DBRPA requires determining where sales occur. Andrus 
and Oosterhuis correctly observe that using location of 
sales to allocate income “raises several particularly diffi-
cult issues,81 including: the treatment of remote sales, the 
treatment of sales through intermediaries, the treatment 
of sales of raw materials, components and intermediate 
goods, the treatment of capital goods sales and the treat-
ment of services.”87 At minimum, addressing these issues 
would require augmented information exchange and 
potentially some degree of collection assistance. These 
issues also have first-order ramifications for DBRMPA, 
and so are addressed further below. Another important 
issue discussed below is that, like both sales-based FA and 
RFA, DBRPA likely requires countries to agree on rules 
that define the corporate income tax base.
Other technical questions also arise in thinking about 
DBRPA.88 Such issues include the treatment of losses, 
the treatment of flow-through entities, the treatment 
of certain financial transactions, and the treatment of 
M&A. In addition, financial accounting treatment may be 
problematic, and there are important questions about the 
compatibility of these ideas with tax treaties and interna-
tional trade commitments. These issues were outlined in 
the 2016 Andrus and Oosterhuis effort. I do not rehash 
that discussion below, although these concerns may be 
relevant to a DBRMPA as well.
B. Destination-Based Residual Marketing 
Profit Allocation
A DBRMPA has the same starting point as a DBRPA: 
affiliates of an MNE are compensated for their functions 
on a cost plus or return on assets basis using arm’s-length 
principles. Unlike in the DBRPA, however, the “residual 
return” must then be divided between marketing or cus-
tomer-based intangibles and other intangibles. This divi-
sion is necessary in order to then allocate income deemed 
to arise from customer-based or marketing intangibles to 
the market of destination for the good or service, while 
allocating the remaining residual return under existing 
transfer pricing principles.
Going forward in this Part I will use the term “market-
ing intangibles.” There may very well be a substantive 
distinction between marketing intangibles and customer-
based intangibles. For example, in the U.S. core deposits 
of a financial institution were historically thought of as a 
“customer-based” intangible, but might not be a market-
ing intangible. Similarly, the value of a “network effect” 
might be considered a “customer-based” intangible but 
not a marketing intangible.89 However, in this discussion 
I explicitly do not intend to invoke such substantive dis-
tinctions. I am simply choosing a single term (marketing 
intangibles) for ease of exposition.90
The conceptual motivation for the DBRMPA derives 
from at least two sources. First, some believe certain 
export-driven jurisdictions would adamantly reject a 
DBRPA. However, at least two of the most prominent 
of these jurisdictions, Germany and Japan, may believe 
that the intangible value held by their domestically- 
headquartered corporations derives primarily from 
production intangibles rather than from marketing 
intangibles. Thus, these jurisdictions (the theory pre-
sumably goes) might be willing to accept a DBRMPA. 
Second, some policymakers may believe that marketing 
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intangibles are fundamentally “customer-based,” and 
therefore more appropriately allocated to jurisdictions of 
destination (“the market”) than is income attributable to 
other intangibles.
Both of these premises are subject to doubt. For purposes 
of this paper, however, I will set those two questions aside 
and limit myself to administrative and pragmatic issues 
associated with the DBRMPA. This drafting decision 
is not because I’m persuaded by the premises described 
above.
The DBRMPA raises three basic administrative con-
cerns. First, it retains all of the problems of current transfer 
pricing law, because with respect to residual returns that 
are not allocated to the marketing intangibles current law 
applies. Second, the proposal imposes an inadministrable 
distinction between residual returns associated with mar-
keting intangibles and other residual returns. Third, since 
a DBRMPA allocates residual returns associated with 
marketing intangibles to the market jurisdiction, all the 
challenges associated with any destination-basis income 
tax proposal are present in the DBRMPA.
The problems of current transfer pricing law are well-
known, and were also discussed in Part IA. Part IIIB.1 
discusses historical evidence suggesting that the distinc-
tion between marketing intangibles and other intangibles 
is not administrable, and also considers various potential 
solutions to that concern. Part IIIB.2 discusses the dif-
ficulties associated with determining destination for 
purposes of allocating revenues in a destination-basis 
income tax. There are two sub-issues. First, mechanisms 
used in the VAT to determine destination do not work in 
an income tax. Second, solutions to determine destination 
by building on existing income tax-based concepts are 
insufficiently robust. Part IIIB.3 describes the difficulties 
that arise because the DBRMPA relies on unitary tax 
principles for purposes of allocating costs, but not for 
purposes of determining revenues. Part IIIB.4 concludes 
that the DBRMPA, while it seems attractive as a political 
compromise at 100,000 feet, entails a level of complexity 
and embedded sources for further conflict as between 
sovereigns and as between sovereigns and multinationals 
that is problematic. It also would require a significant 
degree of international tax harmonization.
1. Dividing a Residual Return Between Marketing-
Based and Other Intangibles. The DBRMPA raises 
an important and likely technically irresolvable point 
of controversy: the extent to which residual returns are 
attributable to customer-based or other intangible assets.
A legislative definition of “marketing” or “customer-
based” intangibles would presumably be required to 
operationalize a basic DBRMPA proposal. One could 
certainly imagine such definitions. For example, a statute 
might define income associated with patents, copyrights, 
trade secrets, and any other intangible clearly related to 
product function or composition as “production-based” 
intangible income, and specify that all other income not 
allocated to a routine return was “marketing intangible” 
income. Alternatively, a statute could define market-
ing intangibles to include trademarks, tradenames, and 
franchises as well as the value of installed customer bases, 
expectation of future business from that base, and goodwill 
and going concern value.
A working legislative definition does not solve the 
underlying valuation problem. Conceptually the 
DBRMPA requires valuation of all “marketing intangibles” 
as distinct from all other intangibles in order to produce 
a ratio via which all residual income could be divided 
between marketing intangible income (which in this usage 
can equivalently be called “customer-based intangible 
income”) and other intangible income.
This issue—distinguishing between customer-based 
intangibles and other intangibles—is not new for U.S. law. 
Prior to enactment of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1993, many categories of intangibles were eligible 
for income forecast depreciation, often on accelerated 
schedules.91 As a result the value of customer-based 
intangibles as opposed to patents and other intangibles 
acquired in various transactions had to be determined. 
Amortization deductions before 1993 depended on the 
acquirer’s ability to establish that an acquired intangible 
had a limited useful life that could be established with 
reasonable accuracy and an ascertainable value separate 
from goodwill, since goodwill was non-amortizable.92 
Amortizable intangibles were then amortized under vari-
ous useful lives.
In contrast, Code Sec. 197 spreads amortization over a 
15-year straight line period, without regard to their “type.” 
Code Sec. 197 obviates the need to ascertain individual 
valuations for different categories of intangibles, and 
greatly diminishes the incentive taxpayers once had to 
characterize acquired intangibles as assets distinguishable 
from goodwill and going concern value.
Fred Goldberg, a former Commissioner of the IRS, 
explained the administrative problem created by prior 
law to Congress in 1992, shortly after he left the job 
of Commissioner of the IRS and became the Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy. He testified that 
the need to allocate basis among purchased intangibles 
not only resulted in substantial uncertainty and dis-
similar treatment of similarly situated taxpayers, but also 
imposed large wasteful transaction and administrative 
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costs on taxpayers and the government. Before 1993, 
disputes over the amortization of customer-based or 
market-based intangibles, including but not limited to 
items such as core deposits held by financial institutions, 
insurance expirations, and newspaper and magazine sub-
scription lists, produced many prominent, large dollar 
litigations.93 As one author described the problem, “the 
governance of purchase price allocations to intangible 
assets [has become] an administrative quagmire and a 
judicial disaster.”94
For tax years between 1979 and 1987, for all unre-
solved audit cases (on any issue) in examination, appeals, 
or litigation as of mid-1989, in fully 70% of those cases 
in which taxpayers claimed that an intangible assets had 
a determinable useful life over which amortization was 
available, the IRS proposed adjustments and claimed that 
the assets were in fact goodwill.95 Moreover, for that same 
period, the single category of intangible assets over which 
this dispute arose most often were customer or market-
based intangibles.96 The debate before 1993 regarding 
acquired intangibles largely focused on distinguishing 
between customer-based intangibles and goodwill, the 
latter of which was not amortizable under pre-1993 law. 
But the core problem was allocating purchase price premia 
across intangible asset categories generally.
This same issue—whether an intangible is a customer or 
market-based intangible or some other intangible (good-
will or something else) would arise in a new guise in a 
regime that distinguishes between “marketing intangibles” 
and other intangibles. As long as one result is more favor-
able for the taxpayer on the one hand or the government 
on the other, or for one government or another, incentives 
for controversies regarding classification arise. But relative 
to pre-1993 U.S. law, the difference would be that instead 
of being limited to cases where intangibles were acquired, 
the controversy would arise with respect to every single 
cross-border transaction in which a non-routine return 
existed. The intangible classification incentive of a foreign 
sovereign where any DEMPE functions took place and the 
incentives of the IRS would always be at cross-purposes. To 
paraphrase Fred Goldberg’s 1992 congressional testimony 
regarding the analogous issue a generation ago, if we go 
down this path, “[n]o amount of after the fact enforce-
ment and litigation can possibly remedy the situation.”97 
We will have re-created a mess from a generation ago and 
compounded it exponentially.
a. A “Two-Sided” Valuation Solution? Another key dif-
ficulty with a DBRMPA arises from the fact that, like the 
DBRPA, this is a transactional method. The DPRMPA 
therefore has the complexity associated with determining 
profit levels on a product line by product line and country-
by-country basis.
However, the DBRMPA differs from the DBRPA in 
that it requires a profit split of the residual profit being 
allocated for each transaction between profits attributed to 
marketing intangibles and other residual profits. A meth-
odology must be chosen to undertake this profit split.98 
In transfer pricing terms, on first impression a DBRMPA 
would seem to require application of the transactional 
profit split method to all transactions, even where only 
one party makes unique and valuable contributions.
We’ve spent years in transfer pricing trying to limit the 
use of the transactional profit split method. The OECD’s 
recent guidance on the application of the transactional 
profit split explains why: “[a] weakness of the transactional 
profit split method relates to difficulties in its applica-
tion.”99 As a result, the OECD perspective is that “where 
the accurate delineation of the transaction determines 
that one party to the transaction performs only simple 
functions, does not assume economically significant risks 
in relation to the transaction and does not otherwise 
make any contribution which is unique and valuable, a 
transactional profit split method typically would not be 
appropriate.”100 For the same reason, the OECD maintains 
that “a lack of comparables alone is insufficient to warrant 
the use of a transactional profit split.”101
In various high-profile cases over the years, the appli-
cation of the transactional profit split produced highly 
intractable disputes between taxpayers and governments 
and between competent authorities in governments. One 
well-remembered example is the IRS transfer pricing dis-
pute with Glaxo SmithKline Holdings (Americas) Inc. & 
Subsidiaries (“GSK”) for the tax years 1989–2005.102 The 
essence of the dispute was over the level of U.S. profits 
reported by GSK after making intercompany payments 
that needed to take into account production intangibles 
developed by and trademarks owned by its UK parent, 
relative to the value of GSK’s marketing intangibles in 
the United States.103
The facts of the GSK case required coordination between 
the United States and the UK with respect to what current 
OECD TPG would describe as a two-sided transactional 
profit split. The public record suggests the UK government 
never acceded to the U.S. assertion as to the share of the 
GSK profits that were attributable to U.S. marketing 
intangibles rather than UK production intangibles.104 The 
GSK case is particularly well-remembered, and the size of 
the dispute was unusual, but the basic setup is not unique.
Two-sided transactional profit splits lend themselves to 
requiring intergovernmental coordination through MAP 
to avoid double juridical taxation. Even after the BEPS 
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project and the advent of the multilateral instrument, 
mandatory binding arbitration is still available only in a 
limited set of MAP cases, and the risk of failures of MAP 
coordination remains high in transactional profit splits. 
Sometimes, maybe this is just the way it has to be. But 
why would we want to adopt an international tax system 
that sets up this exact type of dispute between taxpayers 
and governments and as between national tax administra-
tions in every case; including in the broad swath of cases 
where everyone previously agreed the transactional profit 
split method had no relevance?105
b. A Relative “Capitalized Expenditure” Approach? 
Another potential approach to splitting residual profit 
between profits being allocated to marketing intangibles 
and profits being allocated to other intangibles could involve 
specifying which expenditures contribute to developing 
marketing intangibles and which expenditures contribute to 
developing other intangibles. Governments would then pre-
sumably establish “useful lives” for various buckets of expen-
diture. The resulting relative “capitalized values” associated 
with marketing intangibles as compared to other intangibles 
would produce a ratio. The ratio would change each year 
as a result of both new expenditures by the MNC and the 
operation of whatever “amortization schedule” was adopted 
for the various buckets of expenditure. The “amortization 
schedule” would not produce actual deductions; it would 
simply establish the annual ratio of “marketing intangibles” 
to “other intangibles.” That ratio (as it adjusted each year, 
presumably on a product line by product line basis), would 
provide the ratio of excess return to be allocated through the 
current arm’s-length system as opposed to being assigned to 
market jurisdictions for each specified product line.
Something akin to this approach is said to have been 
used in some advanced pricing agreements entered into 
by some multinationals both with the IRS and with for-
eign tax administrations. But generalizing this approach 
would be very resource intensive. Moreover, the approach 
transmutes the debate as to what constitutes a “marketing” 
or “customer-based” intangible as opposed to other intan-
gibles into a debate as to what costs develop a “marketing 
intangible” and what costs develop other intangibles (e.g., 
production intangibles) and what the respective useful 
lives of such expenditures should be.106 It is unclear to 
me that this represents a meaningful improvement on 
the basic two-sided DBRMPA method described in Part 
IIIB.1.a. It certainly highlights the relationship between 
the problem of relative valuation in a DBRMPA and the 
useful life issues Code Sec. 197 was enacted to eliminate.
Finally, the relative capitalized expenditure approach is 
hard to translate into the context of the digital business 
models that are at the heart of this debate. Which expen-
ditures can be attributed to creating “network effects,” 
and thereby a form of “marketing intangible?” Considered 
prima facie as an intellectual matter, arguably few or none. 
But is that an answer that would be globally accepted?
c. A “One-Sided” Valuation Solution? The central 
problem described in Parts IIIB.1.a and IIIB.1.b arises 
as a result of the attempt to put relative values on the 
intangibles associated with “marketing intangibles” as 
compared to other intangibles. Again, in IIIB.1.a valuing 
“marketing intangibles” and “other intangibles” respec-
tively is just a mechanism to create the ratio of excess 
return to be allocated through the current arm’s-length 
system as opposed to being assigned to market jurisdic-
tions. IIIB.1.b, produces the same ratio through a relative 
“capitalized asset” approach.
Another alternative to resolve the relative valuation 
marketing intangible/other intangible allocation prob-
lem would be to value the excess return that should be 
ascribed to specifically listed production intangibles. The 
system could then allocate the residual—that is to say, 
the excess return remaining after subtracting the return 
given to non-routine production intangibles—to the 
“marketing bucket” and assign it to market jurisdictions 
on a destination-basis.
This one-sided DBRMPA method would avoid the 
problem described in Parts IIIB.1.a and IIIB.1.b with 
respect to dividing residual returns between marketing 
intangibles (the market) and other intangibles (the current 
transfer pricing system) using a ratio. Instead, one could 
imagine using a one-sided method by attempting to locate 
a comparable uncontrolled transaction for non-routine 
production intangibles,107 or by applying a profit indica-
tor, for example a return on costs associated with specified 
production intangibles (or some other net profit indicator).
This latter approach (a one-sided profit indicator 
approach) is similar to the OECD’s “transactional net 
margin method” (“TNMM”) (known in the United States 
as a comparable profits method), but with one important 
difference. The OECD TPG specify that a TNMM is only 
supposed to be applied when one of the two parties owns 
and controls all the relevant non-routine intangibles.
MNCs would be incentivized to adapt tax planning 
to a one-sided DBRMPA, which would value the return 
to “marketing intangibles” as a residual after a return 
is ascribed to non-routine production intangibles. In a 
one-sided DBRMPA world with DEMPE rules (i.e., the 
BLTV) for the allocation of the return ascribed to pro-
duction intangibles, MNCs would seek to a) locate their 
production intangibles in low-tax jurisdictions and b) 
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maximize the valuations for their production intangibles. 
Nevertheless, because excess returns are so large for the 
world’s leading companies, the one-sided methodology 
DBRMPA, which ascribes a specified return to production 
intangibles and gives everything else to the market, would 
likely allocate most (high) excess returns to the market/
marketing intangibles.
A one-sided DBRMPA methodology that values only 
specified production intangibles is intellectually distin-
guishable from a DBRPA. However, as a practical matter 
the one-sided DBRMPA produces a result that asymptoti-
cally approaches the outcome in a DBRPA. It also has 
all the issues associated with determining destination in 
DBRPA, without achieving one of the DBRPA’s virtues, 
which is eliminating the administrative problems associ-
ated with current transfer pricing law.
It should also be noted that the reason the DBRPA is 
not currently under consideration internationally does not 
appear to be related to whether it is normatively defensible. 
Rather, the DBRPA is not part of the debate because it is 
politically unpalatable to a number of major jurisdictions 
and other constituencies that oppose allocating all or most 
of the residual return from intangible assets to market 
jurisdictions. The one-sided DBRMPA methodology 
could be politically unpalatable to those same jurisdictions 
and other constituencies.
Finally, one should note that the one-sided DBRMPA 
methodology described above is in some sense the inverse 
of the “digital investment” idea put forth by Wolfgang 
Schön.108 Schön’s idea treats “digital investment” as the 
functional equivalent of the “marketing intangible” in 
the DBRMPA. Schön suggests that market-specific digital 
investment should be measured, and the return associated 
with that investment should be valued using a TNMM-
type approach and allocated to market jurisdictions. How 
that measurement would be accomplished is not entirely 
clear, but Schön’s idea is quite interesting. It could be inte-
grated into the current transfer pricing system more easily 
than any DBRMPA concept. And the digital investment 
concept certainly would not asymptotically approach a 
DBRPA. It is unclear whether the Schön’s proposal is being 
considered as a mechanism to implement the marketing 
intangibles idea. However, the terminology used by Schön 
and the terminology that has been used publicly to date 
in the marketing intangibles discussion do not overlap.
d. A “Formulary DBRMPA” Solution? Some might 
acknowledge the problems of allocating between produc-
tion intangibles and marketing intangibles based on either 
a “two-sided” or a “one-sided” transfer pricing method, 
and then suggest that the issue should simply be resolved 
by agreeing a percentage allocation to the market. For 
instance, governments could agree that distinguishing 
between market intangibles and other intangibles was 
not systematically administrable, and therefore the excess 
return should just be divided based on fixed percentages 
(50/50) between market jurisdictions and the existing 
arm’s-length standard (the BLTV). A formulary approach 
clearly does address the allocation problems described 
above with respect to the DBRMPA as between market-
ing intangibles and other intangibles. Moreover, it does so 
without asymptotically approaching a DBRPA.
However, formulary DBRMPA likely raises the issues 
traditional FA raised in the United States. In other words, 
because activity is mobile, but sales are not, jurisdictions 
would be incentivized to abandon a 50/50 split and move 
in the direction of a 100% allocation to destination.
U.S. states use an FA system to determine their taxable 
share of U.S.-source corporate profits. The basic mechan-
ics of an FA system, in which intercompany transactions 
are generally ignored, are thus familiar to most U.S. tax 
lawyers. A generation ago U.S. state corporate tax appor-
tionment formulas were based on a weighted average of the 
shares of sales, payroll, and assets in the state.109 However, 
these formulas create an implicit excise tax on the factors 
used in the formula.110 As a result, the three-factor formula 
discourages MNCs from investing in assets or generating 
employment in high-tax locations.
Over the years the states of the United States shifted (in 
inconsistent ways) away from three-factor apportionment 
toward sales-only apportionment factors to gain a com-
petitive advantage in attracting tangible investment and 
jobs.111 In the international setting, with higher tax rates 
than state income taxes and fewer coordination mecha-
nisms to limit competition, most serious commentators 
agree that this dynamic would be more intense. Moreover, 
customers are much less mobile than employment in the 
cross-border setting, so economic theory would suggest 
that a sales-based apportionment should produce fewer 
economic distortions than an apportionment formula that 
took location of employment into account.112
Formulary DBRMPA would crystallize the problems of 
the BLTV. Research consistently shows that high skilled—
DEMPE-capable—labor is the most mobile form of labor 
globally (certainly more mobile than the payroll and assets 
factors of traditional FA). Meanwhile consumers are quite 
immobile. The dichotomy between an apportionment 
factor that is immobile and an apportionment factor that 
is highly mobile, with fixed percentages to each, creates 
an implicit excise tax on the mobile factor. That reality 
would likely push countries in the direction of unilater-
ally choosing a 100% allocation to the immobile factor 
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(the location of the consumer), in order to eliminate the 
implicit excise tax on high-skilled jobs that the 50/50 split 
would create, just as U.S. states over-weighted sales and 
abandoned the payroll factor to encourage job creation in 
their jurisdictions. Moreover, in the international system, 
even more than at the level of the U.S. states, it is not 
clear what enforcement mechanisms exist to ensure that 
countries abide by an agreed 50/50 split. Bilateral tax trea-
ties are not well-suited to enshrining such an approach.
The one potential solution I see to the pressures cre-
ated by the formulary DBRMPA’s implicit excise tax on 
DEMPE jobs in higher-tax jurisdictions is to abandon the 
BLTV. Governments could decide to revert to pre-BEPS 
TPG for the part of the excess return attributed to other 
intangibles and allocated under transfer pricing rules. In 
that world, contractual allocations of risk would be more 
fully respected and income shifting for the “other intan-
gibles” portion of excess returns would be somewhat easier 
than under current law. But shifting income would not 
require shifting well-paying (and highly mobile) jobs out 
of higher tax jurisdictions. Reverting to the pre-BEPS TPG 
therefore would reduce the otherwise inevitable pressure for 
countries to unilaterally move from a DBRMPA to a 100% 
allocation of the excess return to the market jurisdiction.
2. Problems with Relying on Destination for Income Tax 
Purposes. In any system that allocates part of the return to 
the market (in other words, any “destination-basis” system) 
the tax burden is meant to rest in the jurisdiction of the 
final consumer, rather than the jurisdiction of residence 
of any intermediaries in the supply chain. The economic 
rationale for this result is that the final consumer is thought 
to be the least mobile factor. Thus, from a theoretical 
economics perspective, a destination-basis system is less 
economically distortive than other more mobile bases for 
assessing corporate tax.113
However, if the administrative mechanism for measur-
ing the location of sales does not conform to the location of 
the final consumer, this justification for attempting to tax 
at destination is undermined. Importantly, multinationals 
can easily structure their transfer pricing arrangements to 
book sales income in a jurisdiction that is not the jurisdic-
tion of residence of the final consumer and are incentivized 
to do so if they can lower their tax burden as a result.
The U.S. international income tax system has been cog-
nizant of this category of issue for decades; it is at the heart 
of both the 20th century understanding of Code Sec. 482 
and the 1962 foreign base company sales income rules.
For the same reason, every destination-basis income tax 
proposal relies on a concept of destination separate and 
apart from the contractual decision MNCs make about 
where to book sales. Andrus and Oosterhuis, as well as 
other commentators, in effect suggest that concepts for 
determining destination that have evolved outside the 
United States for purposes of implementing the value-
added tax might be modified for purposes of administering 
a DBRMPA.114 The VAT does effectively establish destina-
tion by means of proxies and administrative solutions in 
the consumption tax context in most cases. The difficulty is 
that the mechanisms the VAT uses for this purpose simply 
are not amenable to implementation in an income tax.115
a. Inapplicability of VAT Best Practices. The VAT gen-
erally resolves the issue of determining destination using 
the credit-invoice mechanism. Two of the most important 
features of the credit-invoice mechanism are taxation on 
gross amounts and imposition of tax on every transfer, 
both intra-firm and inter-firm.
An income tax cannot adopt the credit-invoice mecha-
nism for one key reason: income taxes tax net income, 
rather than gross revenues. In an income tax cross-border 
business input purchases are generally deductible. In 
contrast, the VAT establishes destination in large mea-
sure by providing cross-border business input purchases 
a treatment that is the equivalent of non-deductibility.116
i. Destination of Goods. For tangible goods, VAT laws gener-
ally assess VAT using frontier or border controls.117 Imported 
goods are in effect treated as having the destination of the 
jurisdiction where they clear customs. VAT is assessed on 
the full value of the good as it enters the jurisdiction. VAT 
laws then free exports of VAT through a combination of 
non-inclusion of proceeds and a refund mechanism for VAT 
previously paid. As a result, the VAT avoids the difficulties a 
destination-basis income tax would have with cross-border 
sales through third-party intermediaries.
The reason third-party cross-border intermediation does 
not obscure destination in the VAT is that the intermediary 
pays a full tax on its purchases, and has the full amount 
refunded on re-export. Exports are not included in the tax 
base, and then a tax based on the sales price of the good 
is collected at the jurisdiction of (further) destination. 
A similar result applies with respect to importation of 
intermediate inputs (whether raw materials, components, 
or intermediate goods) that are subsequently exported as 
part of a different tangible good, and (thanks to expensing) 
even with respect to capital goods that are purchased to 
allow for the manufacture of other products for export.118 
In all cases the credit-input system thereby moves the tax 
burden to the final buyer.
This VAT system for ensuring that tax is collected at 
destination only works because the system taxes on a 
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gross basis and refunds on every intra-firm and inter-firm 
transfer. An income tax cannot adopt this basic element of 
the credit-invoice mechanism as it operates in cross-border 
situations and remains a tax on net income. As a result, 
the VAT does not provide useful guidance for resolving 
problems of destination of goods in an income tax system.
ii. Location of Services. Determining the destination of 
cross-border trade in services and intangibles more gener-
ally has been a key issue in reforming the VAT for the 21st 
century.119 Since there are no customs controls to impose 
the VAT at the point of importation on services and intan-
gibles, creating administrable proxies for the destination 
principle in services and intangibles is challenging. The 
OECD has developed special guidelines for determining 
the jurisdiction of taxation for international supplies of 
services and intangibles over the last decade that attempt 
to reflect the destination principle.
Determining the location of services raises especially dif-
ficult issues in the MNC context.120 In many cases, MNC 
service recipients utilize the services of a service provider 
in multiple jurisdictions. The country that the services 
are billed to can become a mechanism for manipulation 
in a DBRMPA.
Charge-out mechanisms of the kind used in today’s 
income tax system can and do conceptually resolve the 
problem of determining the destination of services an 
MNC recipient receives and uses in multiple locations in 
the VAT context.121 However, the difficulty raised by this 
solution for tax administrations in the DBRMPA context 
is different and should not be trivialized. Tax administra-
tions would need to audit service recipients to determine 
whether charge-outs had been made appropriately in order 
to inform their audit of the service provider. While charge 
outs can be a subject of audit in today’s income tax system, 
tax administrators never need to ask whether charge outs 
by an unrelated party change the tax result for a separate, 
unrelated taxpayer. The level of internal coordination such 
a system would require of government auditors simply 
does not exist today within tax administrations.
b. Known Solutions Building on Income Tax 
Administrative Concepts Are Insufficiently Robust. 
As noted above, sales through third-party distributors 
would raise substantial avoidance and/or enforcement 
issues for a DBRMPA. Since the administrative features 
of the VAT cannot help, other anti-abuse rules would 
be needed in a DBRMPA to address the tax incentive to 
structure operations to have customers purchase products 
through a third-party distributor in a low-tax jurisdiction. 
Most likely some type of look-through rule would be 
required.122 However, making a look-through rule work 
would require reporting by third party distributing pur-
chasers. Andrus and Oosterhuis imagine implementation 
of this sort of system in the context of single-factor sales 
apportionment.123
Getting buy-sell arrangements with third-party distribu-
tors to be treated equivalently to related party distribution 
arrangements or third-party agency distribution arrange-
ments would be challenging. In theory, a DBRMPA 
would also need similar look-through rules to allocate 
revenue from sales of intermediate inputs to third-party 
manufacturers. Ideally these sales would be allocated on 
a look-through basis based on the country of sale of the 
end good into which intermediate goods are ultimately 
incorporated. However, because this structure is infeasible, 
Andrus and Oosterhuis recommend treating the place 
where the goods are incorporated into products of the 
purchaser as the location of sale.124 The sale of capital goods 
raises a more extreme version of the same problem—these 
are in effect the sale of intermediary goods with a long 
useful life the value of which is then embedded in end 
consumer goods and services.
Andrus and Oosterhuis suggest that to prevent ram-
pant abuse, we would need to distinguish between “real” 
manufacturing and mere re-importation or packaging (this 
would backstop the look-through rule for distributing 
purchasers). As they wrote “[t]he location, for example, 
of the final packaging or labeling of products can too eas-
ily be manipulated if a significant tax advantage results.” 
They then suggest the contract manufacturing rules (which 
distinguish manufacturing from repackaging) might be 
used to address this concern.
Those familiar with the difficulties in administering 
and unintended planning engendered by the contract 
manufacturing rules might be concerned about adopting 
a facts and circumstances test for all cross-border transac-
tions, rather than the occasional instance of foreign base 
company sales income. However, the primary problem 
is a deeper one: in this case the jurisdiction in which a 
tax administration would need to audit the question of 
whether real manufacturing had occurred would often 
be a jurisdiction in which the MNC under audit has no 
physical presence. And, as with the location of service use 
discussed in IIIB.2.a, tax administrations would again 
be in the position of auditing one business to figure out 
where taxing rights lie for the profits of an unrelated 
corporation. Absent a radically improved and stream-
lined environment for both information exchange and 
international tax administrative assistance, how are the 
arising enforcement questions supposed to be addressed? 
Licensing arrangements and franchising structures raise 
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parallel but—from an audit perspective—perhaps more 
complicated questions than those described above for 
third-party intermediary sales.125
c. Other Methods of Identifying Destination. There 
may be mechanisms outside historic VAT or income tax 
practice to identify the destination of some goods and ser-
vices. Two examples that come to mind are pharmaceutical 
products and technology that has an IP address. In the 
pharmaceutical industry for non-tax regulatory reasons 
businesses generally must keep track of the destination 
of their products even when those products are being 
distributed by third-party distributors. An IP address 
can be used as a proxy for location, so a DBRMPA could 
potentially treat goods that have an IP address as having 
the destination associated with their IP address.
The question that then arises is whether destination can 
be determined using such non-tax proxies for most, some, 
or only a low percentage of goods and services that generate 
excess returns. The answer to this question is unclear. What 
is certain is that the destination of all goods that generate 
excess returns is not determinable based on piggybacking 
on non-tax regulatory rules or relying on IP addresses.
d. Relationship Between FDII and Any Destination-
Based Allocation System. Interestingly, the IRS and the 
U.S. Treasury are likely to put all the above-discussed 
concepts for determining destination to the test. New 
section 250 of the Code (“FDII”) in effect establishes 
a preferential tax rate for income derived by domestic 
corporations from serving foreign markets. The statutory 
rules require determining the foreign portion of deduction 
eligible income. This amount includes income derived 
from the sale of property to any foreign person for a for-
eign use. It also includes income derived in connection 
with services provided to any person not located within 
the United States, or with respect to property that is not 
located in the United States. Thus, the destination of 
both goods and services must be determined in order to 
implement the new FDII rules of Code Sec. 250. The IRS 
and the Treasury will need to write regulations describ-
ing how taxpayers should make these determinations in 
the coming 12 months in order to implement the FDII 
regime. Any multilateral organization or foreign sovereign 
evaluating a proposal for a DBRMPA would therefore be 
well-advised to evaluate the regulatory output of the IRS 
and the Treasury in this regard.
3. Problems with Unitary Approach. As discussed ear-
lier, a DBRMPA relies on the DBRPA with respect to 
the portion of the excess return of the MNC allocated 
to marketing intangibles. The DBRPA in turn is not a 
formulary system, because it measures returns at a product 
line level and provides jurisdictions “credit” for higher 
prices. However, escaping the formulary label does not 
equate to escaping the related “unitary” label. The DBRPA 
calculates most revenues at a country level, but it calculates 
costs on a global consolidated basis, just like the “unitary” 
aspect of FA.
An important downside of global consolidation is that 
it requires a common measure of taxable income across 
jurisdictions. In other words, one needs a single measure-
ment of apportionable income. That is the “unitary” aspect 
of FA. DBRMPA may not require a common measure of 
gross income, but it would require common rules regard-
ing costs. The most obvious category of costs that need 
common allocation rules are indirect costs. The problems 
of indirect cost allocation are familiar to U.S. practitioners 
from the foreign tax credit system and our current debates 
about the GILTI. A DBRMPA would need globally agreed 
rules about analogous difficult issues.126
Moreover, for the DBRPA to work well, schedules for 
depreciation or amortization of tangible and intangible 
property, treatment of original issue discount—and per-
haps even issues like the method used for inventorying 
costs or the treatment of fines and penalties—would 
ideally be standardized across jurisdictions. As Julie Roin 
explained a decade ago with respect to FA, unitary systems 
become inadministrable if global costs must be measured 
for purposes of determining income in each jurisdiction, 
but each jurisdiction has its own rules with respect to when 
those global costs are taken into account.127
These issues with the “unitary” dimension of FA are 
well-trodden ground. What observers may not appreciate 
is that the DBRMPA does not avoid those issues. Indeed, 
because the DBRMPA requires allocating indirect costs on 
a product line basis rather than a QBU basis, the unitary 
concerns that require tax harmonization to address may 
be more extensive than under FA.
4. Conclusions re DBRMPA. The DBRMPA combines 
many of the administrative problems of a residual appor-
tionment system and an arm’s-length system in an attempt 
to produce a political compromise. That political compro-
mise allocates part but only part of the residual return to 
market jurisdictions. Replacing the current international 
tax rules with this system would entail substantial institu-
tional transition costs in the United States and elsewhere.128
Adopting a system that combines the issues of a residual 
apportionment system based on destination with the issues 
of an arm’s-length system reduces the stakes associated with 
the challenges of each part of the new combined system if 
MARCH 2019 107
and only if the relative share of the excess return allocated 
to each part of the new combined system is clear. In this 
regard, a relative valuation-based DBRMPA recreates the 
administrative quagmire we had in the United States for 
valuing acquired intangibles prior to 1993, and expands 
it to every cross-border transaction involving an intan-
gible.129 In contrast, a “formulary DBRMPA” would 
resolve this issue by agreeing an arbitrary percentage split 
of excess returns so as to allocate a set percentage of the 
excess to market jurisdictions and the remainder to the 
current arm’s-length standard. However, the formulary 
DBRMPA may be subject to the same dynamic that mani-
fested itself in connection with traditional three-factor 
FA in the United States. In other words, jurisdictions are 
likely to have economic incentives, revenue incentives, or 
both to abandon the agreed split and move toward a larger 
allocation to the market.
Separately, any DBRMPA method—whether “two-
sided,” “one-sided,” or “formulary”—would face the same 
issues associated with international tax base harmoniza-
tion that apply to unitary taxation systems, as well as the 
issues associated with determining destination without a 
credit-invoice system. Finally, all versions of the DBRMPA 
would maintain the problems of the current arm’s-length 
system for transfer pricing on the other intangibles side 
of the marketing intangibles vs. other intangibles divide.
IV. Pairing Inbound and Outbound 
Minimum Taxes?
This section presents and evaluates a combination of 
inbound and outbound minimum taxes as a solution to 
the current debate over transfer pricing and the allocation 
of taxing rights as among jurisdictions. Minimum taxes 
include traditional CFC-based solutions, which rely on 
relative immutability of corporate residence, and newer 
ideas that combine outbound and inbound minimum 
taxes. Such ideas appear to have entered the OECD 
debate. “Minimum effective taxation” is also an issue that 
Germany has recently raised at the most senior levels in 
European Union policy discussions.
Notably, the GILTI and the BEAT could respectively be 
described as an attempt to have outbound and inbound 
minimum taxes, or as an attempt to ensure minimum 
effective taxation. In this Part IV, I will suggest that the 
GILTI and the BEAT can be reimagined to suggest a 
workable alternative for the medium-term future of the 
international tax system.
I expect the United States will continue to describe 
the GILTI and the BEAT with our current acronyms. 
However, the reconceived system I describe below is per-
haps better described as a combination of an outbound 
minimum tax and something like a “reverse CFC” rule.130 
The basic concept would be to pair some outbound 
minimum tax regime (a reformed GILTI) with defensive 
measures that would only be applied to multinationals 
parented in countries that do not impose a qualifying 
outbound minimum tax.
A. Outbound Minimum Taxes
The GILTI is now highly familiar for the participants at 
this conference. At the highest level, the GILTI requires 
a U.S. shareholder of CFCs to pay a minimum aggregate 
U.S. and foreign tax on its share of the earnings of its 
CFCs on a current basis. Unlike other dividend exemption 
systems, the structure of the regime imposes tax on most 
CFC income, but does so at a lower rate than domestic 
income.
As a practical matter the United States is likely to main-
tain some form of this outbound minimum tax regime 
over the medium term. At the present time the Republican 
party believes it has renewed American competitiveness 
with its corporate rate cut and hopes to protect the basic 
structure and rates. Meanwhile, Democrats are proposing 
to raise the corporate income tax rate and the GILTI rate 
along with it, but have not suggested altering the basic 
architecture of the regime. That political playing field 
is unsurprising given that at a 50,000 feet level one can 
describe the GILTI regime as the Obama Administration 
proposal to “Impose a 19 Percent Minimum Tax on 
Foreign Income,”131 just enacted at Republican rather 
than Democratic rates.
Although the basic architecture of an outbound mini-
mum tax is likely to be a stable feature of U.S. international 
tax law, the technical details of that construct are subject 
to change. The 2017 legislation is legislatively unstable 
in the sense that various provisions expire by their own 
terms between 2021 and 2025. It is politically vulnerable 
to revision, because it was enacted via a party-line vote. 
Finally, it is technically unstable for reasons having to do 
both with how some provisions are difficult to administer 
and others may create unintended incentives.132
A few examples of political and technical instability of 
specific features of the current GILTI construct are worth 
mention. At the political level, Democrats are focusing on 
the QBAI regime, which exempts a small portion of CFC 
income from the minimum tax, as creating (unintended) 
incentives for offshoring tangible investment and related 
jobs.133 Meanwhile, at the technical level, Dana Trier’s 
paper correctly highlights the complexity created by the 
QBAI regime, as well as the problems created by the 
QBAI regime’s interaction with the treatment of debt.134 
Separately, many commentators view the GILTI’s reliance 
Taxes The Tax Magazine® MARCH 2019108
ERA OF DIGITAL DISRUPTION
on the existing foreign tax credit and subpart F mechanics 
to be administratively inadvisable. There are likely more 
elegant ways to impose a minimum tax than building a 
system based on calculations at the shareholder level using 
rules written for entity-level calculations.135 It also is not 
clear why elements like foreign base company sales income, 
foreign base company services income, and Code Sec. 
956 are necessary components of a minimum tax regime.
I view the combination of a stable basic architecture 
(an outbound minimum tax regime) and flexibility as to 
features and technical/mechanical details of the regime as 
an opportunity for meaningful multilateralism.136 From a 
U.S. perspective, the pragmatic reality is that GILTI may 
be reformed to function more effectively, but the basic 
minimum tax concept seems unlikely to be repealed over 
the medium term. From a non-U.S. perspective, the key 
political fact is that the United States was historically the 
biggest impediment to a floor to tax competition. Now the 
United States has in effect embraced such a regime, with-
out necessarily settling on the details in any permanent 
way. For countries that have wanted a floor on corporate 
tax competition and felt the United States was an obstacle 
to such a result, the unsettled state of GILTI is an oppor-
tunity for meaningful and potentially efficacious dialogue.
Two non-American sovereigns that may find a minimum 
tax proposal attractive are Germany and Japan. It is impor-
tant to understand why: these are export-driven economies. 
To the extent source becomes defined as destination, which 
is the trend we see in the other proposals discussed in this 
paper, these countries’ national interest is to find an alter-
native to a destination-based income tax system. They and 
other export-driven economies might also find minimum 
tax systems attractive to the extent that they are concerned 
that the incidence of a destination-based income tax is more 
similar to that of a consumption tax than it is to a residence-
based corporate income tax. The most viable alternative to 
a destination-based income tax is a multilaterally agreed 
inbound/outbound minimum tax regime that supports a 
version of the residence-based system.
A minimum tax regime that undergirds residence-based 
taxation is based on concepts that all currently exist in the 
law of multiple countries. Therefore, it should be easier 
to agree on and implement than a shift to destination-
basis taxation. Moreover, such a regime is more objective 
than trying to ascribe relative value to different kinds of 
intangibles.
One important problem with any outbound minimum 
tax regime is that it applies only to tax-resident MNCs, 
and therefore creates incentives to redomicile. Outbound 
minimum taxes lower the benefits to a resident MNC 
eroding the domestic tax base. However, to the extent 
the United States, or any other country, imposes such 
a tax, and no other country does the same, the country 
or countries imposing the outbound minimum tax on 
resident MNCs discourage corporate tax residence and 
encourage foreign tax domiciliation for multinational 
enterprises. Senator Portman’s Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations study entitled “Impact of the US Tax Code 
on the Market for Corporate Control and Jobs” persuasively 
showed that under prior U.S. law “foreign acquirers that 
hail from more favorable tax jurisdictions are able to cre-
ate value simply by restructuring the affairs of the U.S. 
target companies to improve their tax profile.”137 The 
United States understandably does not want to be in that 
world, and other countries would not want to be, either. 
I testified to Congress about evidence that an important 
medium-term result of pressures for redomiciling MNCs 
out of the United States by tax-driven acquisitions of U.S. 
firms by foreign firms would be fewer high-quality jobs 
for U.S. workers.138 The same would hold true for any 
country that unilaterally adopted an outbound minimum 
tax without appropriate defensive measures.
Importantly, multiple countries adopting an outbound 
minimum tax for resident multinationals alone also would 
not in and of itself solve the problems associated with 
cross-border M&A to escape that taxpayer-unfavorable 
residence country tax net. Without a “defensive measure,” 
all it takes is one viable corporate headquarters jurisdiction 
to defect and choose not to have an outbound minimum 
tax for the dynamic favoring acquisitions by tax-favored 
MNCs to take hold. For that reason, given the fungibility 
of tax residence for business units (which can be acquired), 
new businesses (which can incorporate initially abroad), 
and multinationals as a whole (which are routinely 
acquired in cross-border M&A transactions) simply dif-
ferentiating tax burdens based on tax residence, without 
measures to discourage avoidance of a basic residence tax 
burden, is untenable as a policy option.
1. Relationship of Outbound Minimum Taxes to 
German Royalty Barrier. In 2017, Germany enacted 
the Act against Harmful Tax Practices with regard to 
Licensing of Rights (German EStG 4j). This provision of 
German law restricts the tax deduction of royalties and 
similar payments made to related parties if such payments 
are subject to a non-OECD-compliant preferential tax 
regime and are taxed at an effective rate below 25%.139 
This rule has a quite targeted scope, but it evolved from 
a more general German interest in proposals to encour-
age or ensure minimum effective taxation. The concept 
of encouraging minimum effective taxation at a general 
level, rather than on an item-by-item basis, continues to 
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be of interest to German policymakers, including at the 
finance minister level.140 Importantly, the German idea of 
minimum effective taxation as it has developed in EStG 4j 
would appear to reflect a country-by-country conception 
of minimum effective taxation.141
B. Inbound Minimum Taxes
The U.S. Congress was cognizant of the problems associ-
ated with taxing resident multinationals in a harsher way 
than non-resident multinationals when it enacted the 
2017 Act. The “Unified Framework for Fixing Our Broken 
Tax Code” discussed the importance of “rules to level the 
playing field between U.S.-headquartered parent compa-
nies and foreign-headquartered parent companies.”142 In 
reporting the BEAT to the Senate floor, the Senate Finance 
Committee explained that “the current U.S. international 
tax system makes foreign ownership of almost any asset or 
business more attractive than U.S. ownership … creating a 
tax-driven incentive for foreign takeovers of U.S. firms … 
[and] has created significant financial pressures for U.S. 
headquartered companies to re-domicile abroad and shift 
income to low-tax jurisdictions.”143 The Senate Finance 
Committee’s explanation went on to explain that the 
BEAT was supposed to be an administrable way to meet 
the promise of the framework to level the playing field.
Unfortunately, the BEAT as enacted does not appear 
to have met this goal. However, the concept of using an 
inbound tax to defend residence-based taxation is quite 
rational. Importantly, the defense of an outbound mini-
mum tax would work best if undertaken via multilateral 
coordination.
1. The BEAT That Could Be: A Reverse CFC Rule. Four 
high-level changes would be required to convert the BEAT 
into a useful inbound base erosion prevention mechanism 
that also encourages foreign sovereigns to adopt outbound 
minimum taxes. First, the BEAT would need to be 
amended so as not to apply to multinationals tax resident 
in a jurisdiction that imposed a qualifying minimum tax 
regime. The definition of a qualifying outbound minimum 
tax would presumably follow the contours of a multilateral 
agreement. Second, the reformed BEAT would need to 
be limited to actual base-eroding payments. Most impor-
tantly this would mean repealing the disallowance of 
foreign tax credits and NOLs in present law BEAT. Third, 
the base erosion percentage limitation would need to be 
excised. Finally, the BEAT would need to be expanded to 
cover at least the value of intangible property embedded 
in goods, or perhaps to cover goods in their entirety. As 
explained below, the last of these is viable if the purpose of 
the reformed BEAT were to incentivize other jurisdictions 
to adopt qualifying outbound minimum taxes, rather than 
to raise revenue.
The inbound regime (“BEAT 2.0”) described above 
could be accurately described as a “defensive measure.” 
The base amount would still be determined by taking the 
taxpayer’s taxable income increased by certain base erosion 
items. As in the current regime, taxpayers would multiply 
the BEAT base amount by a given percent of the BEAT 
base. If that amount exceeded their otherwise-applicable 
U.S. tax liability, they would pay the difference between 
the BEAT amount and their regular tax liability.
However, unlike the current BEAT, this regime would 
apply only to multinational groups that were not subject at 
the parent level to an (internationally-recognized) qualify-
ing outbound minimum tax. As a result, countries whose 
multinationals operate extensively in the U.S. market 
would have an incentive to adopt qualifying outbound 
minimum taxes. The incentives in this regard would be 
much stronger if the United States and the European Union 
and/or Japan were to take such steps in a coordinated fash-
ion. In a multilaterally agreed minimum tax regime with 
coordinated defensive measures, MNCs would have strong 
incentives to remain headquartered in key jurisdictions that 
had qualifying outbound minimum taxes and were thus 
part of the new international consensus.
Various criticisms of this approach are available. Let me 
address just three. First, this approach would require some 
degree of agreement with respect to the acceptable outer 
boundaries of outbound minimum tax regimes. Minimum 
standards with respect to an outbound minimum tax 
regime represent a certain degree of tax harmonization. 
Some might fear this would represent a slippery slope 
toward even further tax harmonization, and that such con-
straints on tax competition are inappropriate. However, I 
would suggest to such critics that tax sovereignty is a basic 
interest of national sovereigns, and that a small step in the 
direction of coordinated rules may not in this case be a 
particularly slippery slope.
Moreover, note that the minimum tax regime likely 
requires much less tax harmonization than the DBRMPA. 
Inbound minimum taxes used as defensive measures to 
backstop the outbound minimum tax regime require 
determining some effective tax rate for the outbound 
regimes of jurisdictions that formally impose an out-
bound minimum tax. Otherwise countries could adopt 
an outbound minimum tax at the appropriate rate on a 
very narrowly defined base.
But note that the harmonized base definition issues are 
actually less extensive than in the DBRMPA. Unlike in 
a DBRMPA (or user participation), in the minimum tax 
structure the national rules that determine the base from 
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which the effective tax rate is measured only matters with 
respect to the question of whether a national defensive 
measure is imposed. As a result, the pressures for countries 
to agree on a shared definition of the appropriate tax base 
are low. In the minimum effective taxation regime, the base 
only matters for the purpose of measuring the effective 
tax rate imposed in another jurisdiction, rather than for 
purposes of actually splitting up the tax base. As a result, 
inconsistent national definitions are fine within some 
wide margins. In contrast, in the DBRMPA and under 
user participation, the absence of base harmonization can 
have consequences in every case, because both of those 
approaches are unitary tax systems. Consistent definitions 
are needed to split up a base and therefore avoid double 
taxation. As a result, the pressures to harmonize are higher.
Second, Part IIIB.1 highlights why it is difficult to write 
regulations that separate embedded intangibles from the 
overall value of a tangible good in an administrable way. 
Sales of products containing embedded intangibles present 
a challenge for any inbound base protection rule that is 
meant to be WTO-compliant while raising revenue; rather 
than acting as an incentive for other countries to adopt a 
regime that is exempt from the inbound base protection 
rule/defensive measure.144
In contrast, if the inbound base erosion/defensive 
measure rule applies only to multinationals that are not 
subject to a qualifying outbound minimum tax regime, 
and if (for example) the United States, the European 
Union, and perhaps Japan have all adopted such regimes, 
then “rough justice” that erred on the side of inclusion 
in destination country tax bases would not be a prob-
lem.145 Indeed, onerous rough justice would help ensure 
widespread adoption of qualifying outbound minimum 
taxes. As more jurisdictions adopted qualifying outbound 
minimum taxes, the treatment of COGS in cross-border 
transactions with corporations’ whose parent entity was tax 
resident in a jurisdiction without a minimum tax would 
become ever less important.146
Third, some might suggest that the minimum tax 
solution would not stop some sovereigns from separately 
enacting unilateral measures to ring-fence and tax large 
U.S. tech firms participating in the digital economy. I 
have sympathy for this critique. We are living through a 
mercantilist and politically charged moment in interna-
tional economic law (and the United States is not exempt 
from this characterization). In the current environment, 
some sovereigns do seem to want a shift of the “digital” 
tax base, rather than to ensure a single level of tax on 
corporate income. The minimum tax proposal does not 
affect a shift of the tax base from residence to destination, 
and does not serve a mercantilist end in the digital sector. 
Thus, some sovereigns might take unilateral measures to 
accomplish their desired ends with respect to the digital 
sector on top of a minimum tax. Indeed, this concern may 
motivate the marketing intangibles proposal.
However, given that the United States already has a 
GILTI and is unlikely to repeal it in the medium term, 
I do not believe the “but it won’t stop other countries’ 
digital proposals” critique substantially changes the U.S. 
policy calculus. Rather, if other sovereigns see redeeming 
features in the basic outlines of the American status quo, 
that outcome is in the national interest of the United 
States. This conclusion does not change if it turns out that 
multilateral agreement on a minimum effective taxation 
regime does not also completely stop unilateral efforts by 
some sovereigns to target the U.S. tech sector. No proposal 
(including the marketing intangibles proposal) can fully 
stop such efforts in any case; the political reality abroad 
that views the U.S. tech sector with distrust is simply too 
strong. What is important is that an agreement to imple-
ment a minimum tax block a multilateral agreement on a 
digital-only proposal, and also that the foreign countries 
most interested in a minimum tax outcome commit 
(including on a bilateral basis) not to pursue digital-only 
measures.147 In other words, although the tech sector is 
an important U.S. national interest, it is clearly not the 
only U.S. national interest in the field of international 
taxation. Rather, our broadest interest should be to stabi-
lize the international tax system generally, ensure that its 
architecture remains principled, provide certainty for all of 
our businesses, and bring our new international tax system 
more closely into alignment with international norms.
Although a multilateral agreement on a minimum 
effective taxation regime would not necessarily stop every 
foreign sovereign from enacting tech-specific tax proposals, 
it would likely discourage many sovereigns from doing so. 
To provide a simple example, if the German government 
were to agree to a minimum tax proposal as a solution to 
the digital tax question, and commit not to enact a digital-
only proposal, it seems unlikely they would renege over 
the medium term. In my judgment the diplomatic and 
technocratic political culture of Germany is not such that 
it would agree to a solution to the digital issue that involved 
a minimum tax multilaterally, and then shortly thereafter 
enact a digitally-focused tax. A similar observation might 
be made about many governments (consider Japan for 
example). If the European Commission were to sign on 
to a minimum effective taxation agreement to settle the 
digital tax debate, it is also unlikely that the letter of the 
agreement would be abandoned. In that particular case, 
from a U.S. perspective having both EU member states and 
the Commission commit to an agreement is important. 
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The United States should insist at the OECD that the 
Commission be an independent party to any agreement.
To address any concerns about individual countries 
behaving perfidiously, the United States should consider 
including a punitive measure in its reformed inbound 
minimum tax (BEAT 2.0) to discourage the imposi-
tion of particularly destructive taxes. For example, in 
my view today’s gross basis turnover taxes on digital 
business represent a relatively transparent mercantilist 
effort to target U.S. firms. U.S. law could be structured 
so as to apply the reformed BEAT to jurisdictions that 
imposed taxes targeted at U.S. MNCs, even if they 
adopted a minimum tax regime. As a statutory matter 
one could use Code Sec. 891 as a model in this respect. 
Such a tool would be perceived to have legitimacy 
internationally if it were tied to a multilateral agreement 
on minimum taxation. International legitimacy (even 
if not complete acceptance) should be an important 
consideration for those of us concerned with reestab-
lishing stability in the broader international economic 
law environment.148
Finally, one might be concerned that the United States 
itself might want to abandon the minimum tax at a future 
date. The United States could unilaterally overcome its 
fiscal challenges and obtain fiscal leeway to lessen its reli-
ance on our economically inefficient corporate double tax 
by adopting a new revenue source, such as a VAT. At that 
juncture a multilateral minimum tax regime would func-
tion as an unwelcome constraint. However, a new revenue 
source is not in the offing at this time in the United States. 
Moreover, it seems unlikely that the political process will 
soon sanction reducing corporate tax rates by increasing 
individual income taxes. As a result, anti-base erosion 
measures will probably continue to be needed over the 
medium term.
Conclusion
The international tax system that emerged after World War 
II had the important advantage of being nestled within a 
broader world order that, in Henry Kissinger’s classic for-
mulation, “had the advantage of uniform perceptions.”149 
Countries accepted that the United States led the post-war 
international economic order of the free world. Almost as 
a minor corollary, countries generally accepted that the 
United States led the development of the transfer pricing 
regime, too.
In contrast, few observers would claim that today’s 
international economic climate features uniform percep-
tions. The current state of international tax affairs reflects 
the broader disarray.
One important goal in this difficult environment should 
be to reestablish some stability to the international tax 
regime. Among other things, doing so could contribute to 
the broader goal of stabilizing our system of international 
economic law more generally.
If medium-term international tax stability is a goal, any 
answer to the questions raised by the digital economy can-
not be limited to any definition of the digital economy, 
because no corporate international tax problem is unique 
to the digital economy. Moreover, the features of the digital 
economy that proponents of a digital-only solution might 
point to are gradually expanding to encompass the bulk 
of the economy.
However, the digitization of the economy does force 
policymakers to confront a basic choice between destina-
tion-based corporate income taxation and residence-based 
corporate income taxation. A shift from our residence-
based system to a destination-based corporate income tax, 
if agreed to by the major economies, is certainly a viable 
option. But moving to a DBRPA would require signifi-
cantly higher levels of information exchange and collection 
assistance than currently exist. More fundamentally, a shift 
all the way to a destination-based corporate income tax 
presently seems politically implausible.
Indeed, the current debate internationally does not 
include a full move to destination-based corporate income 
taxation as an alternative. Instead there are two proposals 
that in effect split the baby between destination-based 
corporate income taxation and residence-based corporate 
income taxation. These are the user participation theory 
and the DBRMPA.
The latter “compromise” proposal, the DBRMPA, is 
principled and, at the 100,000-foot level, may appear 
politically attractive. It does change the balance of alloca-
tion of taxing rights. However, the DBRMPA creates a 
new set of administrative challenges for which we may not 
have solutions, while leaving the problems of the current 
transfer pricing system in place, and adding a new source 
of fundamental controversy—the appropriate split of 
excess returns between the market and the current transfer 
pricing system. These issues could play out as between 
governments and between governments and MNCs with 
respect to every cross-border transaction. What analyzing 
the DBRMPA highlights is that compromise between a 
destination-based income tax and a residence-based cor-
porate income tax, even principled compromise, is hard 
to administer. Splitting the baby is probably unwise. If 
policymakers wish for a destination-based income tax, 
they should really try to go all the way there.
That said, if policymakers consider the compromise 
that is the DBRMPA, they should abandon the notion 
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at the external EU border. If freedom of estab-
lishment constraints prevented application of a 
defensive measure by EU sovereigns in regard 
of payments to other EU member states, that 
limitation would not raise any fundamental U.S. 
policy concern.
146 Importantly, so long as the inbound minimum 
tax is intended as a defensive measure rather 
than a meaningful revenue raiser, principled 
answers with respect to the currently intractable 
problems raised by embedded intangibles and 
foreign corporations with no taxable nexus 
under current standards are simply not neces-
sary. Given the technical challenges raised by 
these two issues, the ability to avoid them is a 
significant advantage.
147 In the case of Germany, an important question 
also arises as to whether there should be a com-
mitment to block EU-level digital-only solutions.
148 More generally, the points above about coor-
dination as to minimum standards for an out-
bound minimum tax regime would not require 
agreement as to all the details of the inbound 
minimum taxes (defensive measures) enacted 
by individual countries that are intended to 
backstop the outbound minimum tax regime.
149 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy 27 (1994). Not only 
was the United States the only country with the 
economic might to organize the international 
tax system of the capitalist world—its capacity 
to dictate international tax rules was part of a 
broader reality in which, in the Cold War period, 
the United States in effect organized most 
aspects of the economic and military structure 
of the noncommunist developed world. U.S. 
tax leadership, like U.S. political and economic 
leadership more broadly, was accepted in large 
part because of a threat the developed noncom-
munist world perceived; namely that without 
U.S. leadership the world might fall under Soviet 
domination.
150 Alternatively, one could perhaps imagine 
deemed presence rules combined with some 
minimum distributor-type returns meant to 
apply to all businesses. As with a formulary 
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DBRMPA system, the principles underlying such 
a system and the international law sources that 
would stabilize it and ensure that any agreement 
would be respected are not clear. However, 
unlike a DBRMPA system, such a system (which 
arguably builds on Wolfgang Schön’s digital 
investment concept could potentially be bolted 
on to the existing bilateral tax treaty system. C.f. 
n. 109 and accompanying text, supra.
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